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SMART CARS, TELEMATICS AND REPAIR
Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai*
ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a surge in the use of automotive telematics. Telematics 
is the integration of telecommunications and informatics technologies. Using 
telematics in cars enables transmission of data communications between the car 
and other systems or devices. This opens up a wide range of possibilities, including 
the prospect of conducting remote diagnostics based on real-time access to the 
vehicle. Yet, as with any new technology, alongside its potential benefits, the use of 
automotive telematics could also have potential downsides. This Article explores 
the significant negative impact that the growing reliance on telematics systems 
could have on competition in the market for repair services.
Our analysis highlights two main areas where the use of telematics for vehicle 
diagnostics may pose a threat to competition and consumer choice. First, we focus 
on the manner by which manufacturers communicate with their customers via the 
telematics system. Due to the special relationship between car manufacturers and 
their consumers, which is often based on trust and loyalty, alongside the “captive 
audience” status of drivers, we argue that communications emanating from the 
car’s telematics system could be deceptive. Second, we explore the negative impact 
that the shift away from on-board diagnostics to telematics could have on 
independent repair shops’ access to diagnostic information.
Fortunately, the law can adapt to keep pace with these new technological and 
commercial developments. This Article articulates the combined multi-prong, 
multi-agency policy approach needed to maintain an effective right to repair cars 
in the new age of telematics. Among other things, our analysis supports an update 
of state consumer protection legislation and an increased policing by the Federal 
Trade Commission of practices employed by car manufacturers. In addition, we 
highlight the need to consider certain amendments to intellectual property laws 
that effectively aid car manufacturers in maintaining exclusive control over their 
telematics systems and diagnostic data.
* Leah Chan Grinvald, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Suf-
folk University Law School; Ofer Tur-Sinai, Associate Professor of Law, Ono Academic Col-
lege (Israel). For helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions, the authors are grateful to 
Mark Lemley, Aaron Perzanowski, Michal Shur-Ofry, and Leanne Wiseman, as well as the 
participants of the WIPO International IP Forum at Ono Academic College (Israel, 2019); 
Second Annual IP & Innovation Conference, Suffolk University (Boston, 2019); Israeli IP 
Scholars Annual Workshop, Tel Aviv University (Israel, 2019); and The Right to Repair Un-
der Siege Workshop, Griffith University (Brisbane, Australia, 2020). Deep appreciation is 
also expressed to the editors of this journal for their thoughtful review and dedicated edito-
rial efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself driving your car home from work. Suddenly, 
the “Check Engine” light on your dashboard turns on. A few sec-
onds later, an authoritative voice emanating from the vehicle’s
speakers alerts you of a bad catalytic converter or a problem with 
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one of the car’s oxygen sensors. It then continues to inform you of 
the nearest authorized dealership, where the service department 
can fix the problem. You can even use a click-to-call button in-
stalled on your dashboard that would put you in direct contact with 
that dealership, enabling you to make an appointment right away. 
What would you do?
It is safe to assume that in such a scenario, many people would 
be inclined to fix their cars at the authorized dealership, if not 
immediately, then at some later point.1 Yet, even if a consumer de-
cides to take her car to her loyal, local garage rather than to the 
dealership, there is no guarantee that the mechanic would be able 
to diagnose and repair the problem, certainly not as efficiently as 
the dealership could.2 This is, in large part, due to the fact that the 
mechanic would not have access to the same diagnostic infor-
mation that is available to the manufacturer and its authorized 
dealerships in real time.3
The scenario described above is not science fiction, but rather a 
very plausible scenario, in light of major technological advances in 
the field of car diagnostics4 and the growing connectivity of cars.5
In recent years, the car industry has moved towards producing 
“smarter” cars with telematics systems. “Telematics” is an emerging 
interdisciplinary technological field, integrating telecommunica-
tions and informatics.6 Telematics systems employed in vehicles al-
low real-time information from the vehicle’s operating system, in-
cluding diagnostic information, to be transmitted wirelessly. While 
1. See Adrian Ma, Your Car Talks to the Manufacturer. Advocates Want It to Talk to You, 
Too, WBUR: BOSTONOMIX (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/08/06
/right-to-repair-ballot-measure [https://perma.cc/8A6K-N9C7] (quoting Barry Steinberg, 
an independent auto shop repair owner: “If Big Brother comes on in your car and says, ‘Go 
to your Honda dealer,’ 90% of people are going to listen to them . . . .”).
2. See Sarah Kessler, The Connected Car of the Future Could Kill Off the Local Auto Repair 
Shop, QUARTZ (Sept. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1054261/the-connected-car-of-the-future-
could-kill-off-the-local-auto-repair-shop [https://perma.cc/2D3D-8YM3].
3. See id. (describing how some manufacturers are routing data through their own 
servers).
4. See, e.g., Colin Pawsey, Advanced Automotive Diagnostics Systems—From Diagnostics to 
Prognostics, AUTO. IQ (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.automotive-iq.com/autonomous-drive
/articles/advanced-automotive-diagnostics-systems-from-diagnostics-to-prognostics [https:
//perma.cc/7MBJ-VLLR] (describing developments in the field, “including the use of arti-
ficial intelligence and deep learning neural networks to develop advanced prognostic sys-
tems”).
5. See I. Wagner, Connected Cars – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 15, 2020), https:
//www.statista.com/topics/1918/connected-cars [https://perma.cc/V4LQ-YB8D] (project-
ing that out of the more than 1 billon cars used globally, sales of connected cars would hit 
approximately 28.5 million in 2019).
6. See, e.g., Xiaoguang Tian, Victor R. Prybutok, Fouad H. Mirzaei & Catalin C. 
Dinulescu, Millennials Acceptance of Insurance Telematics: An Integrative Empirical Study, 23 AM.
BUS. REV. 156, 158 (2020) (“Automotive telematics is described as the integration of tele-
communications and informatics technologies applied to the transportation industry.”).
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the ability to obtain real-time diagnostic information about a car is 
a positive development for car safety and possible vehicle longevity, 
as with any new technology, there are some significant potential 
downsides. This Article focuses on the potential negative effect of 
the rise of telematics on competition in the market for car repairs.7
Up until recently, diagnostic data generated by cars could gen-
erally be retrieved by connecting to a standard on-board diagnos-
tics port (OBD port).8 State law in Massachusetts and a nation-wide 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between major car manu-
facturers and the repair industry guaranteed consumers and inde-
pendent repair shops the ability to access diagnostic information 
available through the OBD port.9 With the switch to telematics sys-
tems, however, such access is currently at risk,10 as these systems are 
not standardized across different car manufacturers, are typically 
7. In this Article, we are focusing on the equilibrium among the various players in the 
marketplace for vehicle repair. There are a multitude of other potential harms, including 
privacy and cybersecurity, which we do not focus on in this piece. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, 
Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway [https://perma.cc
/F6TZ-SDYF] (discussing the dangers of car hacking); Yossi Vardi, What to Expect from Car 
Hackers in 2020 and Beyond, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 22, 2019, 10:25 AM), https:
//venturebeat.com/2019/12/22/what-to-expect-from-car-hackers-in-2020-and-beyond
[https://perma.cc/FZX6-AU7J] (discussing the need for cybersecurity to proactively ad-
dress the threat of car hacking); Geoffrey Fowler, Driving Surveillance: What Does Your Car 
Know About You?, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2019/12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out
[https://perma.cc/TM63-7G9L] (discussing the trove of data that cars can collect regarding 
its drivers); Davey Winder, Your New Car Is a Hacker Magnet –– Automotive Industry Disconnect to 
Blame, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019
/02/06/your-new-car-is-a-hacker-magnet-automotive-industry-disconnect-to-blame/#16b88
b3c3b76 [https://perma.cc/5CHL-GN24] (describing cybersecurity risks in the automotive 
industry). In addition, while we focus on the repair market in the United States, it is im-
portant to note that there are similar issues with cars and repair worldwide. For example, 
the Australian government is considering a mandate on sharing repair information for mo-
tor vehicles, albeit on a limited basis. See Leanne Wiseman, Kanchana Kariyawasam & Lucas 
Davey, The Mandatory Repair Scheme for Motor Vehicles 2019: Australia’s First Response to the Inter-
national Right to Repair Movement?, 48 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 218, 231 (2020) (analyzing the 
proposed mandate).
8. See Kessler, supra note 2.
9. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 2 (2019); Memorandum of Understanding Among 
Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association, Coalition for Auto Repair Equality, Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers and Association of Global Automakers (Jan. 15, 2014), http:
//www.njgca.org/wp-content/uploads/Right-to-Repair-national-MOU-01-23-14.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/M67B-339K] [hereinafter MOU]. In addition, there is a separate MOU for 
commercial vehicles. See Memorandum of Understanding: National Commercial Vehicle 
Service Information (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.autocare.org/workarea/Download
Asset.aspx?id=2646&gmssopc=1 [https://perma.cc/T8YL-FXNM]. In this Article, we will use 
“MOU” to refer to the January 2014 version, which focused on personal vehicles (or “light 
duty” vehicles).
10. See Right to Repair, AUTO CARE ASSOC., https://www.autocare.org/government-
affairs/issues/right-to-repair [https://perma.cc/2PTH-WM7N] (noting the exclusion of 
telematics from the Massachusetts law and national agreement); Kessler, supra note 2; Ma, 
supra note 1.
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secured by technological protection measures, and are excluded 
from the scope of the legislation and the MOU.11
At the same time, the manufacturers’ exclusive control over 
telematics systems enables them to offer repair services and associ-
ated products in a coercive manner that may amount to deceptive 
advertising.12 The coercive nature of the communications emanat-
ing from the system stems from the special relationship that car 
manufacturers have with their consumers, often based on trust and 
loyalty; the “captive audience” status of the driver; and the infor-
mation asymmetry between the parties.13
These two interrelated features brought about by the manufac-
turers’ increasing use of telematics systems—exclusive control over 
diagnostic data and coercive advertising of repair and maintenance 
services—pose a serious threat to competition in the market for car 
repairs and endanger consumers’ right to repair (or choice of
where to repair) their cars.14
This Article posits that maintaining competition in the market 
for car repairs is vital. The justifications for a right to repair in-
clude, inter alia, the need to protect consumers’ sense of autono-
my and enable them to realize an important aspect of product 
ownership, ensure competitive pricing of repair and maintenance 
services and associated products, minimize environmental waste,
and encourage innovation.15 Maintaining competition in the au-
tomobile repair market is particularly important considering the 
centrality of all types of vehicles to the economy. The passenger car 
remains one of the more valued personal property items of most 
Americans.16 A recent Gallup poll found that eighty-six percent of 
Americans own or lease an automobile or some other type of vehi-
cle, and sixty-four percent of Americans drive daily.17 Vehicles and 
11. See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part II.
13. For a detailed discussion of these and other related factors that contribute to the 
coercive nature of telematics-based communications, see infra Section II.A.
14. We use the term “consumer” broadly to include any end user possessing a vehicle, 
whether it is the vehicle’s owner, lessee or driver authorized to use the car, and regardless of 
whether the use is for personal or business purposes.
15. For a detailed discussion, see infra Section 1.A.
16. The average price of a new car in 2019 was approximately $36,000. Anna Hecht, Car 
Prices Are Increasing—Here’s How That Can Hurt Americans, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 11:42 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/car-prices-are-rapidly-increasing-heres-why-thats-bad-
for-americans.html [https://perma.cc/64LD-AKNA]. One insurance company estimates 
that an average renter in a two bedroom apartment has approximately $30,000 in total per-
sonal property. Sienna Kossman, 4 Common Myths About Renters Insurance, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 
12, 2013, 2:00 PM), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/09
/12/4-common-myths-about-renters-insurance.
17. Megan Brenan, 83% of U.S. Adults Drive Frequently; Fewer Enjoy It a Lot, GALLUP (July 
9, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/236813/adults-drive-frequently-fewer-enjoy-lot.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V8PL-EFC3].
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other forms of equipment also play a significant role in the agricul-
tural and military spheres.18 The severity of the harm that could be 
wrought to the U.S. economy by a manufacturer monopoly over 
the vehicle repair market is highlighted by national policymakers 
incorporating a repair agenda into their 2020 presidential cam-
paigns and by the involvement of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).19 Notably, the struggle to maintain competition in the vehi-
cle repair market corresponds with a more general effort to pre-
serve the consumers’ right to repair their own personal devices 
(particularly, consumer electronics).20
Unfortunately, with the rise of telematics, the right to repair ve-
hicles is under siege. In order to ensure that manufacturers do not 
use the new technological abilities to skirt their legal obligations 
and monopolize the market for car repairs, policy makers must pay 
due attention to this area. This Article identifies the potential anti-
competitive effect of the switch to telematics on the vehicle repair 
market and explores concrete directions that could be used to 
tackle the problem.
In order to maintain an effective right to repair cars, we urge 
policy makers to, first, regulate the way in which manufacturers are 
allowed to communicate to their consumers in their cars,21 and sec-
ond, guarantee that access to diagnostic information transmitted 
via telematics systems remains open to all.22 This Article calls for a 
combined policy approach, under which various agencies, includ-
ing state legislatures, courts, the FTC, and Congress, would play 
significant roles. In addition to unfair competition and consumer 
protection law, this Article explores the need to consider certain 
18. See Elle Ekman, Opinion, Here’s One Reason the U.S. Military Can’t Fix Its Own Equip-
ment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/opinion/military-
right-to-repair.html [https://perma.cc/HS7U-2A9H] (concerning the military); Richard 
Jensen, Hackers, Farmers, and Doctors Unite! Support for Right to Repair Laws Slowly Grows, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 20, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/06/hackers-
farmers-and-doctors-unite-support-for-right-to-repair-laws-slowly-grows [https://perma.cc
/4QSN-6ND4] (concerning farmers).
19. See, e.g., Matthew Gault, Bernie Sanders Calls for a National Right to Repair Law for Farm-
ers, VICE (May 5, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xzqmp/bernie-
sanders-calls-for-a-national-right-to-repair-law-for-farmers [https://perma.cc/6Y67-UUX5]; 
Makena Kelly, Elizabeth Warren Comes Out in Support of a National Right-to-Repair Law for Farm 
Equipment, THE VERGE (Mar. 27, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27
/18284011/elizabeth-warren-apple-right-to-repair-john-deere-law-presidential-campaign-
iowa; Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FTC (July 16, 2019), https:
//www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/nixing-fix-workshop-repair-restrictions [https:
//perma.cc/GR2A-VBJU] [hereinafter FTC Workshop].
20. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Intellectual Property Law and the 
Right to Repair, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (2019) (discussing the emergence of a social move-
ment advocating a right to repair consumer products).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
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aspects of intellectual property law and construe them in a manner 
that enables the right to repair to be fully implemented.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we 
provide a brief overview of the various justifications for a right to 
repair that we discussed in general in an earlier piece, while focus-
ing on specific attributes of the car industry.23 Next, we provide a 
historical perspective of the automotive right to repair movement. 
We also outline in greater detail the developments in vehicle 
telematics that may impact the repair market and discuss current 
efforts to update the applicable legal framework to account for 
such developments. All of this provides the context for the rest of 
our discussion, which is comprised of two prongs. First, in Part II, 
we argue that manufacturers have worked hard to create a special 
relationship with their consumers—one based on trust and loyalty. 
In light of this special relationship, and considering the “captive 
audience” status of consumers while they are in their cars, we ar-
gue that there is a high probability that manufacturers’ communi-
cations emanating from a car’s telematics system will be deceptive. 
Based on this prospect, we urge the FTC to become more active in 
policing how manufacturers are communicating repair infor-
mation to their consumers. Second, in Part III, we argue that the 
potential competitive harm in the repair market resulting from the 
manufacturers’ exclusive control over the telematics data feed war-
rants proactive solutions. These include updating state consumer 
protection legislation, as well as closely examining the intellectual 
property laws that effectively aid car manufacturers in maintaining 
exclusivity over their telematics systems and diagnostic data. The
issues surrounding access and control over telematics data are con-
troversial, and this Article’s thesis and arguments will likely face 
challenges. Therefore, we lay out some of these challenges and of-
fer responses to them in Part IV. 
I. THE RIGHT TO REPAIR
In this Part, we briefly discuss the main justifications for a right 
to repair, with a particular focus on their application in the context 
of vehicle repairs. We will then turn to a historical overview of leg-
islative and private ordering efforts to secure a right to repair for 
vehicles and, finally, provide an analysis of why efforts are still
needed to safeguard this right.
23. See Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 83–96.
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A. Justifying a Right to Repair
1.  Consumer Autonomy and Property Rights
One of the most persuasive justifications for a right to repair (at 
least from a consumer’s perspective) is preserving a sense of au-
tonomy, or the ability for the consumer to determine by herself 
what to do with her own personal things.24 Based on this considera-
tion, we previously argued that at the core of a right to repair is the 
individual consumer’s ability to engage in repair activities.25 While 
most consumers are not likely to repair their own cars, consumers
must nevertheless retain a right to choose how, when, and where to 
repair their cars in order to uphold their autonomy and a mean-
ingful sense of property ownership.
The sentiment for autonomy is often intertwined with a property
/ownership rationale that a consumer should have the ability to 
repair because they “own” their “stuff.”26 This justification is prem-
ised on the quid pro quo understanding of a personal property 
transaction: a consumer pays money for a product, and in return
she obtains ownership of that product.27 These two interrelated ra-
tionales have been expressed at public hearings on the topic. For 
example, at a hearing held by the U.S. Copyright Office on access 
to software for purposes of repair, one consumer stated, “it’s my 
own damn car, I paid for it, I should be able to repair it or have the 
person of my choice do it for me.”28
2.  Static Efficiency (Concern for Competition)
Another strong justification for a right to repair is the need to 
maintain competition in the repair market, particularly for vehi-
cles. The overall market for vehicle repair is large. In the United 
24. For a general discussion of arguments rooted in consumer autonomy justifying a 
right to repair, see id. at 67, 81, 89.
25. Id. at 99.
26. See Adam Wernick, The ‘Right to Repair’ Movement Wants You To Be Able to Fix Your 
Own Stuff, THE WORLD: LIVING EARTH (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-
24/right-repair-movement-wants-you-be-able-fix-your-own-stuff [https://perma.cc/QQ8N-
Q7BB].
27. This is certainly how the U.S. Supreme Court views a straightforward sale transac-
tion, stating in the patent context, “[a] sale transfers the right to use, sell, or import because 
those are the rights that come along with ownership.” Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1534 (2017).
28. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SEVENTH TRIENNIAL 
PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION,
INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDED REGULATORY LANGUAGE OF THE ACTING REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 3 (2018) [hereinafter SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING].
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States this includes manufacturers—and their dealerships—and 
independent entities, such as independent repair parts manufac-
turers and both large and small repair shops.29
If manufacturers were able to steer consumers to only author-
ized repair entities, the independent repair market would presum-
ably collapse. Independent repair shops would likely go out of 
business, not to mention the entire industry that has been built on 
supplying various services to these independent repair shops. 
Without competition in the repair market, manufacturers would 
be able to set prices that have no relation to the value of the ser-
vices. Consumers would be forced to decide whether they could af-
ford such repairs or need to forego using their vehicles. For some 
consumers, this choice could have a serious impact on their ability 
to earn a living, as many consumers rely on their vehicles to 
transport them to their places of employment or use their vehicles 
as part of their jobs.30 Recognizing these concerns, the FTC has 
shown a growing interest in ensuring that deceptive practices are 
not creating monopolies in the repair market.31
3.  Environmental Concerns
If personal products, including vehicles, cannot be repaired, 
they are thrown away and end up in landfills.32 The growing inabil-
ity to repair consumer electronic products has caused some coun-
tries to pay greater attention to a right to repair because of the in-
crease in environmental waste.33 While cars that cannot be repaired
29. The Auto Care Association, for example, is a national trade organization that repre-
sents over 150,000 “independent businesses that manufacture, distribute, and sell motor 
vehicle parts, accessories, tools, equipment, materials, and supplies, and perform vehicle 
service and repair.” Auto Care Ass’n, Consumer Tech. Ass’n, iFixit & Owners’ Rights Initia-
tive, Petition to Renew a Current Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (July 
31, 2017), https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2018/petitions-073117/Renewal%20Pet.
%20-%20Repair%20-%20ACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3UF-MJKD].
30. See Adie Tomer, America’s Commuting Choices: 5 Major Takeaways from 2016 Census 
Data, BROOKINGS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/10/03
/americans-commuting-choices-5-major-takeaways-from-2016-census-data [https://perma.cc
/G2G2-8HZQ] (finding that over 76 percent of Americans drive alone to work every day).
31. See FTC Workshop, supra note 19; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
32. See CBC News, Broken Appliances: Why You May Need Repairs More Often, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwfIbm_JrPI (interviewing Nathan 
Proctor).
33. For example, the European Union passed the Waste Framework Directive which 
mandates certain products to be designed to be repairable. Directive 2008/98/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on Waste and Repealing 
Certain Directives, 2008 O.J. (L 312) 3 [hereinafter Waste Framework Directive]; see also
Paul A. Davies, Eun-Kyung Lee & Patrick Braasch, The EU Adopts Four Directives to Solidify Eu-
rope’s Leading Position in Waste Management, LATHAM & WATKINS: ENV’T, LAND & RES.
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can still have their parts and materials salvaged and reused, it is es-
timated that up to twenty-five percent of every car will make its way 
into a landfill.34 Landfills emit their own pollution, and globally, 
countries are working to reduce pollutive emissions of all types.35
Environmental concerns appear to be driving the repair movement 
in the European Union, which has been the most aggressive in leg-
islating for longer end-of-use lifecycles and repair parts availabil-
ity.36 The same rationale supports a right to repair in the United 
States.
4.  Dynamic Efficiency (Innovation)
Lastly, dynamic efficiency considerations provide a strong justifi-
cation for a right to repair. Where repair markets are open, con-
sumers, independent repair shops, and tool developers have the 
ability and motivation to create new methods of repair, develop or 
improve diagnostic and repair tools, and create user-generated 
tips, manuals, and kits that could significantly benefit others.37 In 
addition, engaging in repair requires (and thus, provides an incen-
tive for) observation and acquisition of knowledge. One famous 
example of innovation born out of repair is the first operative air-
plane built by the Wright brothers at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century.38 The brothers, working alone from their bicycle re-
pair shop, solved the problem of “controlled flight” that had 
occupied the minds of many engineers throughout the years.39
Wilbur, one of the brothers, found the solution while toying in 
their store with a rectangular bicycle inner-tube box.40 Wilbur con-
cluded that “by connecting the motion of a flying machine’s wings 
in relation to one another, twisting the axis of the wings in the 
(July 6, 2018), https://www.globalelr.com/2018/07/the-eu-adopts-four-directives-to-solidify-
europes-leading-position-in-waste-management [https://perma.cc/A4CS-THFG].
34. Ben Hewitt, Where Your Car Goes to Die, POPULAR MECHS. (Oct. 1, 2009), https:
//www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a1481/4213384 [https://perma.cc/6XDZ-7YCB].
35. See, e.g., Waste Framework Directive, supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Roger Harrabin, EU Brings in ‘Right to Repair’ Rules for Appliances, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49884827 [https://perma.cc/3V4V-
5G8G].
37. For examples of repair tools and manuals, see IFIXIT, https://www.ifixit.com/ (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2020).
38. See Katherine White, What If Bicycles Held the Secret to Human Flight?, HENRY FORD,
https://www.thehenryford.org/explore/stories-of-innovation/what-if/wright-brothers
[https://perma.cc/L3RQ-YNML]; Brittany McCrigler, The Wright Way: Repair Teaches Engi-
neering, IFIXIT (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.ifixit.com/News/the-wright-way-to-teach-
engineering [https://perma.cc/SHJ6-96C3].
39. White, supra note 38.
40. Id.
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same way a box twists,” a pilot could control the aircraft.41 This led 
to the successful development of the first airplane and is consid-
ered a foundation of modern-day aeronautics.42 The modern-day
automotive industry could similarly benefit from user innovation
born out of repair. 
B. Historical Perspective: Legislation and Private Ordering
The ability to perform maintenance on and repair a car relies on 
the ability to accurately diagnose the car’s status. While diagnostic 
information may not always be a precondition for diagnosing and 
fixing the car’s problem, at the very least it can make diagnosing 
the problem quicker and more efficient.43 Up until recently, most 
diagnostic data generated by various vehicle modules could be re-
trieved by connecting to the OBD port, which is standardized 
across makes and models and for many vehicles is located under 
the steering wheel.44 The standardization of on-board diagnostics 
began with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which re-
quired automakers to equip vehicles with a standardized form of 
emissions monitoring.45 Every vehicle, beginning with the 1996 
model year, was required to have a standardized OBD port 
through which information on the vehicle’s emission system could 
be retrieved.46 Over the years, more diagnostic and repair infor-
mation besides emissions information has become available 
through the OBD port, and a concern arose that access to such in-
formation could be restricted by the manufacturers.47 Against this 
background, several aftermarket organizations joined together 
with a collective goal of securing such access through legislation.48
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., id.; see also McCrigler, supra note 38 (noting other “bike repair concepts”
that are mirrored in the airplane built by the Wright brothers).
43. See, e.g., Motor & Equip. Mfr.’s Ass’n, Nixing the Fix—Call for Research and Data, FTC
1, 14 (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FTC-2019-0013-0022 (click 
on “Download” under “The Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association”) [https:
//perma.cc/5JKD-U2GT] [hereinafter MEMA Submission] (“Open and unbiased access to 
diagnostic information is essential for all repairers and do-it-yourself consumers.”).
44. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 ROUNDTABLE 56 (Apr. 25, 2018), https:
//www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/hearing-transcripts/1201-Rulemaking-Public-Roundtable-
04-25-2018.pdf#page=56 [https://perma.cc/6NUM-WAFQ].
45. EPA, ON-BOARD DIAGNOSTIC REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS 2 (2003), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100LW9G.PDF?Dockey=
P100LW9G.PDF [https://perma.cc/F3GY-FFS3] [hereinafter EPA].
46. Id. at 8.
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In 2012, Massachusetts became the first and only state in the 
United States to enact an “automotive right to repair” law that re-
quired manufacturers to provide independent repair shops access 
on “fair and reasonable terms” to the same types of repair infor-
mation and tools that it provided to authorized dealers.49 In 2014, 
following this enactment, the Association of Global Automakers 
entered into a MOU with organizations that represented the auto 
repair industry.50 In exchange for the auto industry agreeing to 
make the provisions of the Massachusetts repair law the nationwide 
standard, the repair industry agreed to oppose and not fund new 
state-based legislative initiatives.51 The MOU spans all fifty states 
and covers a majority of automakers in the United States.52
These developments were seen as a win for the auto repair in-
dustry, even though Massachusetts remains the only state to have 
passed car repair legislation and the MOU does not cover all car 
manufacturers in the United States.53 This was the sentiment until 
recently, despite the fact that for some independent repair shops, 
keeping up with the latest manufacturer information even under 
the current regime is expensive and time-consuming. For example, 
where a repair shop services multiple types of vehicles, that shop 
needs to ensure their technicians are continuously trained on a va-
riety of different manufacturer computer systems and also pay to 
access such systems.54 A few recent developments since 2014, how-
ever, have begun to erode the effectiveness of both the Massachu-
setts law and the MOU—including the move towards producing 
“smarter” cars with telematics systems wirelessly connected to the 
49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019); Jonathan Ng, Independent Auto Repair Shops 
Want Right-to-Repair Law Updated, BOS. HERALD (June 18, 2019), https://
www.bostonherald.com/2019/06/18/independent-auto-repair-shops-want-right-to-repair-
law-updated.
50. MOU, supra note 9.
51. See id; Gabe Nelson, Automakers Agree to ‘Right to Repair’ Deal, AUTO. NEWS (Jan. 25, 
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.autonews.com/article/20140125/RETAIL05/301279936
/automakers-agree-to-right-to-repair-deal [https://perma.cc/S6YB-H6J5] (quoting the pres-
ident of the Association of Global Automakers regarding the downside to having 50 differ-
ent state laws).
52. MOU, supra note 9; Our Members, ALL. FOR AUTO. INNOVATION, https:
//www.autosinnovate.org/about/our-members [https://perma.cc/GDH6-C3YH].
53. See Kyle Wiens, You Gotta Fight for Your Right to Repair Your Car, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
13, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/you-gotta-fight-for-
your-right-to-repair-your-car/283791 [https://perma.cc/CLF9-V275] (citing that twenty-
three car manufacturers were required to sign the pledge).
54. See Where We Live, Tell Us: Should Consumers Have the ‘Right to Repair’ Their Own De-
vices?, WNPR, at 24:15–30:05 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.wnpr.org/post/tell-us-should-
consumers-have-right-repair-their-own-devices [https://perma.cc/C53A-WBAM] [hereinaf-
ter Where We Live] (interviewing independent repair mechanic).
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manufacturers.55 This development and its potential impact will be 
discussed in the next section.
C. The Need for Current Efforts to Update Legislation and the MOU
By virtue of the MOU, until recently, the majority of car diagnos-
tic information for most vehicle models could be accessed through 
the car’s OBD port. By plugging a scanning tool into the OBD 
port, mechanics could retrieve the error codes and other diagnos-
tic information from the car, identify the problem, and clear the 
code from the computer’s memory once the problem was fixed.56
Nowadays, however, manufacturers are moving away from hav-
ing the diagnostic information funnel into the OBD system, and 
instead, they are transitioning the information into separate 
telematics systems.57 Passenger vehicle telematics is a growing mar-
ket, with some research positing that approximately forty-seven 
percent of all new cars sold in North America in 2017 included 
some form of telematics system.58 This number is expected to con-
tinue to increase going forward.59
The telematics system is typically the same computer system uti-
lized for in-car entertainment and downloads and, unlike the 
OBD, is not standardized across the different car manufacturers.60
Each car manufacturer has their own type of system, as there is no 
requirement in the MOU or elsewhere that software be standard-
ized.61 Relatedly, various components of the telematics system are 
secured by technological protection measures (TPMs) to bar unau-
55. A different development that has created an obstacle for the auto repair industry is 
a greater use by manufacturers of patents to protect automobile parts and accessories. See
Joshua D. Sarnoff, White Paper on Protecting the Consumer Patent Law Right of Repair and the Af-
termarket for Exterior Motor Vehicle Repair Parts: The PARTS Act, S. 812, H.R. 1879, 115th Congress
1, 13–14 (Nov. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082289; Grin-
vald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 112–16.
56. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 44, at 56.
57. Id. at 57–58; infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
58. The Global Automotive OEM Telematics Market 2018–2023 - Detailed Profiles of 21 Major 




60. See Jake Holmes & Anthony Alaniz, Every Car Infotainment System Available in 2020,
CNET: ROADSHOW (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/car-
infotainment-system-automotive-tech-guide [https://perma.cc/CD4W-UCGF] (highlighting 
the different mainstream brands’ infotainment systems).
61. See Auto Care Ass’n, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 
1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1, 3, https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2018/comments-
121817/class7/class-07-initialcomments-auto-care-association.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N4W-
D9T3].
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thorized access to the system.62 These TPMs typically bar access to 
both copyrighted components (like the entertainment portion of 
the data) and uncopyrightable elements (like the car’s diagnostic 
data).63 Thus, unlike scan tool data, diagnostic telematics data is 
not accessible to everyone. 
The MOU makes clear that the obligations of the covered car 
manufacturers do not apply to the data feed funneled through 
telematics systems.64 It exempts from the scope of the agreement 
“telematics services or any other remote or information service, di-
agnostic or otherwise, delivered to or derived from the vehicle by 
mobile communications . . . .”65 Similar language is found in the 
2012 Massachusetts law, which served as a template for the MOU.66
Currently, the OBD port can still be utilized to access some di-
agnostic information, but testimony from various repair propo-
nents allege that this information is becoming more and more lim-
ited.67 Absent access to the telematic feed, it might be difficult to 
assess what information manufacturers are “hiding” that could be 
useful for diagnostics and repair and is not otherwise available to 
third parties. In the near future, with expected advances in smart 
cars and multiple connected sensors around the car, it could very 
well be that information transmitted exclusively via the telematics 
system will be crucial to diagnosing car issues.68 Clearly, even to the 
62. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–8 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015) (where Ford argued that Autel created a program to circumvent 
Ford’s security measures and access its data compilations without authorization, and then 
used this data in developing a competing diagnostics product).
63. See Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61, at 6.
64. It is worth noting that the car industry believes that it is still under the obligation to 
provide diagnostic information and claims that it continues to do so. Missing from their 
statements, however, is any acknowledgement that the diagnostic information retrieved 
from the OBD is limited in nature. See Ma, supra note 1.
65. MOU, supra note 9, at § 2(e).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 2(f) (2019).
67. See SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING, supra note 28, at 65 (“The OBD port 
does not provide all the same information that happens over the telematics data feed. It 
used to be that was where you got all the information. Increasingly, there’s less and less 
available on those OBD ports.”); id. at 66 (noting, in regard to Tesla, that “there’s almost no 
information on the OBD port and instead it’s all coming over the telemetry data that’s en-
crypted”); Shira Schoenberg, New Right to Repair Battle Rages Between Car Manufacturers and 
Repair Shops, MASSLIVE (May 13, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2019/05
/new-right-to-repair-battle-rages-between-car-manufacturers-and-repair-shops.html [https://
perma.cc/R3E5-2XCF] (noting that “[i]ndependent shops say the law does not adequately 
address telematics” whereas manufacturers say “the old law works just fine” because it al-
ready mandates automakers to provide all information necessary to diagnose and repair a 
vehicle).
68. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 14 (maintaining that “[o]pen and un-
biased access to diagnostic information is essential for all repairers and do-it-yourself con-
sumers”); Auto Care Ass’n, Re: Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Restrictions, FTC 1, 3 (May 
6, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FTC-2019-0013-0010 (click on “Down-
load” under “Comment Submitted by Auto Care Association”) [https://perma.cc/792P-
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extent independent repair shops could diagnose a problem with-
out access to all available data, it would most likely take them long-
er and make their service less efficient and more costly for the cus-
tomer. Furthermore, even if all diagnostic information included in 
the telematics feed were also available through the OBD port, the 
shift to diagnostics over-the-air grants manufacturers the advantage 
of getting the information in real time, whereas independent me-
chanics only get it if and when the car owner brings the vehicle to 
their shop. Altogether, then, unlike in the past where the driver 
could take her car to any mechanic who could plug into the OBD 
port to retrieve much of the diagnostic information needed for re-
pair, independent repair shops in the near future might likely have 
to turn away the driver because she has a “smart car” and a wire-
lessly-connected telematics system. Even to the extent they are still 
able, in principle, to provide repair services to a “smart car,” inde-
pendent repair shops would frequently be in an unfavorable posi-
tion compared to an authorized dealership with access to the 
telematics system.
It should be noted that, aside from using proprietary diagnostic 
tools and software, the manufacturers are required to offer, by vir-
tue of the Massachusetts law and the MOU, some diagnostic in-
formation that can be extracted by scanning tools and applications 
developed by third parties.69 Yet, with the shift toward TPM-
protected telematics systems, such third-party tools and applica-
tions are likely to be blocked from accessing any meaningful data. 
The lack of standardization in the telematics industry is also likely 
to pose difficulties for third party developers.70 In addition, even to 
the extent it is technologically feasible to develop diagnostic tools 
that retrieve data from a telematics system, this process may involve 
infringement of intellectual property rights, as will be discussed be-
low.71
All of this has created the need to update the Massachusetts law 
(as well as the MOU) to ensure that the switch to telematics does 
not curtail access to diagnostic data.72 Yet, the switch to telematics 
has also opened new ways for the manufacturers to communicate 
25PX] (pointing out servicers’ need to access repair information that is increasingly availa-
ble through telematic systems only).
69. For the popularity of third-party diagnostic tools, see, for example, MEMA Submis-
sion, supra note 43, at 14. Such a tool can typically be used to repair multiple models of ve-
hicles.
70. For the lack of standardization in the telematics industry, see supra notes 60–61 and 
accompanying text.
71. For discussion, see infra Section III.B.
72. For discussion of specifics of the ballot initiative that was passed by Massachusetts 
voters and amends the law, see infra Part III.
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with the consumers. As some car industry analysts see it, 
“[t]elematics is . . . helping OEMs [original equipment manufac-
turers] to strengthen their customer association to their brand by 
converting one-time sales into continual service-centered relation-
ships.”73 The next Part argues that this effort to capitalize on manu-
facturers’ relationships with their consumers poses some serious 
concerns for competition in the aftermarket that warrant close 
scrutiny and regulatory or legislative action.
II. TELEMATICS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
The use of telematics enables car manufacturers to identify and 
diagnose certain problems in real time, communicate with con-
sumers regarding such problems, and guide them to fix those 
problems at a specified facility. Depending on the car model, this 
information could be delivered to consumers in various ways, in-
cluding by phone, through e-mail or app messaging, through the 
two-way voice system installed in the car, or via the car’s media 
screen.
The prospect of car manufacturers delivering in-car messaging 
to consumers is not new. Back in 2009, reports surfaced of Mer-
cedes-Benz testing the possibility of using the in-car telematics sys-
tem to advertise products and services, including repair services, to 
drivers.74 Nowadays, the recommendations and offerings to car 
owners can be individually tailored based on the large volume of 
diagnostic information transmitted from the car to the manufac-
turer in real time.75 Such practices are likely to increase significant-
73. Analysis of Embedded Telematics in the Automotive Industry - Global Forecast to 2025 Featur-
ing OnStar, Ford, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz – ResearchAndMarkets.com, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 31, 
2019, 6:34 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191031005444/en/Analysis-
Embedded-Telematics-Automotive-Industry—-Global [https://perma.cc/HTP4-LGXR]. In 
addition, in the SWOT analysis for automakers, it is identified as an opportunity to establish 
direct and long-term customer relationships, and a strength is direct contact with the vehicle 
user. DIETMAR P. F. MÖLLER & ROLAND E. HAAS, GUIDE TO AUTOMOTIVE CONNECTIVITY AND 
CYBERSECURITY: TRENDS, TECHNOLOGIES, INNOVATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 5 (2019).
74. Ralph Hanson, Mercedes to Pilot Ads in Tele Aid Telematics System, MOTOR AUTH. (Apr. 
28, 2009), https://www.motorauthority.com/news/1033006_mercedes-to-pilot-ads-in-tele-
aid-telematics-system [https://perma.cc/AH8Y-MP5D]; Mercedes’ OnStar Clone Tries Out Ads,
PCMAG (Apr. 27, 2009), https://www.pcmag.com/archive/mercedes-onstar-clone-tries-out-
ads-239712 [https://perma.cc/4LX2-G6ZF] (expressing an expectation, in 2009, that “[c]ar 
dealers may soon have a system that lets them send advertising messages via the two-way 
voice and data telematics system in many new cars”).
75. See ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO CONNECTED CARS 6 (2018), http://www2.itif.org/2018-
policymakers-guide-connected-cars.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM5Y-RA62].
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ly in the near future as the use of telematics becomes ubiquitous.76
Notably, the use of tailored advertising, including offerings related 
to predictive maintenance and repair, is not merely a side effect of 
technological developments, but rather a part of a business strategy 
embraced by many vehicle manufacturers.77
The increased ability to rely on remote diagnostics to detect 
problems as early as possible, notify the driver of such problems in 
real time, and encourage preventive maintenance and repair could 
be highly beneficial. At the same time, the practice of manufactur-
ers communicating with car owners in real time based on exclusive 
diagnostic information could significantly increase manufacturers’
competitive position in repair and replacement parts markets, 
which may come at the expense of other important values.78
It is important to clarify upfront that this Article does not pro-
pose banning these practices altogether. Promoting one’s products 
and services is the backbone of commercial business practice.79
Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, the state regulates such 
practices—usually in order to preserve fairness in competition and 
protect consumers from deception and coercive marketing prac-
tices.80 As will be detailed below, telematics-based promotion of re-
pair and maintenance services is a context in which some level of 
regulation may be warranted. This Article argues that due to the 
“captivity” of the consumers in their cars and their unique relation-
ship with manufacturers (that the manufacturers have worked hard 
to create and maintain), telematics-based advertising poses a threat 
to competition and consumer welfare. Policy makers should, there-
fore, pay close attention to manufacturers’ increasing use of these 
76. See, e.g., Ihor Starepravo, From Device-Connected to Car-Connected: Unlock the Full Power 
of Connected Car Commerce, DATA DRIVEN INVESTOR (July 4, 2019) (noting that in-car advertis-
ing is an important avenue for generating value for manufacturers, and that “[t]his use case 
is gaining traction as predictive maintenance and smart telematics becomes mainstream”).
77. See, e.g., id.; MCKINSEY & CO., MONETIZING CAR DATA 24 (2016), https:
//www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly
/Our%20Insights/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing-car-data.ashx [https://perma.cc
/LM67-STDY] (noting such practices as part of the strategies for increasing revenue gener-
ating).
78. For discussion of such values, see supra Section I.A. Surely, there are other concerns 
associated with the use of telematics and in-car notifications, including a safety concern re-
sulting from distraction to the driver.
79. In addition, commercial speech is a form of protected speech, although it is typical-
ly acknowledged that there is a significant governmental interest in protecting consumers 
such that commercial speech can be regulated. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Cit-
izens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding commercial speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial 
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (discussing the history of the First Amendment and com-
mercial speech).
80. See infra Section II.B.
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new technologies to ensure that the costs imposed on society by 
these practices do not end up outweighing their related benefits.
A. Manufacturers and Their Consumers: 
Trust and the Captive Consumer
In order to unpack the significant impact that telematics-based 
advertising could have, this Section will first examine the relation-
ship between consumers and their car manufacturers. It will show 
that car manufacturers have worked to instill a sense of trust and 
loyalty in their consumers.81 Not only have manufacturers con-
vinced their consumers to trust that their cars will be safe and work 
well, but they have utilized a variety of different mechanisms to fos-
ter a loyal relationship with their consumers. In this way, once con-
sumers have purchased their car from one particular manufactur-
er, this relationship is meant to keep drawing them back—for 
maintenance, repairs, and eventually new cars. This Section then 
argues that when the consumer is in the car, the consumer is a 
“captive audience.” This factor could pose a serious threat to com-
petition in the market for repair services and products when com-
bined with the type of information being provided (typically tech-
nical information that the average consumer would not necessarily 
understand) and the unique relationship between the consumer 
and the manufacturer.
1.  Trust and Loyalty in the Car Market
Car manufacturers have been working to build trust and loyalty 
in the American public since the late nineteenth century, with the 
introduction of the personal vehicle.82 First, car manufacturers 
needed to convince the public that cars were safe to drive, notwith-
standing that the early vehicles could be quite dangerous.83 Car 
81. This type of trust is referred to as “system trust,” which “presumes the functionality 
and reliability of a system, and allows trust to be placed in the function of the system rather 
than the individual people involved in it.” Jennifer Tong, Do You Trust Your Car? Enacting 
Car Safety 18 (Spring 2016) (M.A. thesis, Lund University) https://lup.lub.lu.se
/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8894338&fileOId=8894339 (citing NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979)).
82. See DAVID O. WHITTEN & BESSIE EMRICK WHITTEN, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
BUSINESS HISTORY: EXTRACTIVES, MANUFACTURING, AND SERVICES 270–71 (1997) (noting 
that German and French companies began manufacturing personal vehicles at the commer-
cial level in the 1880s; in 1900, there were approximately 8,000 personal vehicles in the 
United States, and by 1926, there were approximately 19 million).
83. See SALLY H. CLARKE, TRUST AND POWER: CONSUMERS, THE MODERN CORPORATION,
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE MARKET 34 (2007).
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manufacturers used a variety of different methods—from straight-
forward advertising to celebrity “influencers,” motor clubs, and 
stunt shows—to attempt to convince the public that they should 
own a car.84 Second, in order to sustain their growth and market 
share, car manufacturers had to cultivate their consumers’ loyalty85
so that consumers would continue to want to return to the manu-
facturer with whom they have this trusting and loyal relationship.86
Sales and financing contracts both helped to begin and sustain this 
relationship with consumers.87
With the move to smart cars, which remain “tethered” to the 
manufacturer in many ways, the relationship between a car manu-
facturer and its consumer may become even stronger and involve a 
greater degree of dependence on the manufacturer. We use the 
term tethering to mean “the strategy of maintaining an ongoing 
connection between a consumer good and its seller that often ren-
ders that good in some way dependent on the seller for its ordinary 
operation.”88 In the era of the “Internet of Things,” tethering be-
comes ubiquitous. Smart cars, in particular, provide their drivers 
multiple functions and services that are based on connectivity, 
starting with navigation and ending in infotainment apps.89 At the 
same time, this connectivity has been strategically used by manu-
facturers to strengthen their direct and long-term relationships 
with car owners and users.90 Telematics, in essence, converts what 
once may have been a “one-time sale” of a vehicle into a continual 
service-centered relationship between the manufacturer and its 
customer. This use of telematics is likely to increase the elements 
of trust and dependency discussed above.
The tethering effect results, to a large extent, from the growing 
variety of connected services that new technologies enable manu-
facturers to offer their customers. Yet, as with the history of the car 
industry and sales contracts, this effect may be further reinforced 
84. Id. at 34, 41–43, 50.
85. Id. at 16 (“As Ford, GM, and Chrysler each claimed a quarter- or a third-stake in the 
market, their future profits depended on sustaining consumers’ repeat purchases or loyal-
ty.”).
86. See Tong, supra note 81, at 23 (describing qualitative empirical research conducted 
that showed how “brand associations” were created, as consumers researched vehicle safety 
and continued to buy from the same brand of cars that they trusted as safe).
87. See CLARKE, supra note 83, at 3–4.
88. Christopher Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy,
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 785 (2019).
89. See, e.g., Nick Statt, Tesla Remotely Disables Autopilot on Used Model S After It Was Sold,
THE VERGE (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:03 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/6/21127243
/tesla-model-s-autopilot-disabled-remotely-used-car-update.
90. See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 77, at 23 (noting that manufacturers are using 
car data analytics, among other things, to improve the link between dealers and customers); 
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
302 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
by the use of certain contractual practices. A smart car, by defini-
tion, contains multiple software components, and those are gener-
ally protected by copyright law and merely licensed to the car own-
er by the manufacturer.91 Software licenses often impose various 
restrictions and limitations on the use of the product in which the 
software is embedded and thereby restrict the ability of customers 
to enjoy what they would otherwise be entitled to as property own-
ers.92 Among other things, software licenses often limit repair and 
modification, ban reverse engineering, and forbid the use of com-
peting products or services.93 Such provisions clearly have a direct 
impact on the ability and motivation of car owners to tinker with 
their cars and dissuade attempts to repair them either inde-
pendently or by using third party services.94 But such contractual 
restrictions also work indirectly to tighten the relationship between 
the customer and the company in a manner that could make the 
latter’s messages regarding maintenance and repair particularly 
impactful.
2.  The Captive Consumer and Information Asymmetry
An additional factor to consider, on top of the unique relation-
ship between the consumer and the manufacturer, is the location 
of the consumer when telematics-based messaging is delivered. 
With a telematics system installed in the car, manufacturers can use 
it (and are increasingly likely to do so) to deliver the diagnosis re-
sult and any accompanying instructions or advice to the driver in 
real time, via the car’s two-way voice system or media screen.95 No-
91. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 798 (noting that sellers insist that copies of 
software are merely licensed even when software is embedded in a device purchased by the 
consumer); Lily Hay Newman, Who Owns the Software in the Car You Bought?, SLATE (May 22, 
2015, 2:37 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/05/gm-and-john-deere-say-they-still-
own-the-software-in-cars-customers-buy.html [https://perma.cc/G52Y-SSKD] (noting in the 
car industry context that General Motors and John Deere claim, based on their copyright on 
the software embedded in their vehicles, that car owners’ license to operate the vehicle is 
subject to warranty limitations, disclaimers and all other contractual limitations).
92. See discussion infra Section III.C.
93. See, e.g., Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 796; see also infra Section III.C.
94. Relatedly, some manufacturers attempt to limit warranty coverage in the event con-
sumers utilize an independent repair service or attempt to do it themselves. See, e.g., Auto.
Oil Change Ass’n, Re: FTC Call for Comments Related to Nixing the Fix: A Workshop on Repair Re-
strictions, FTC 1, 12 (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document/FTC-2019-
0013-0083 (click on “Download” under “AOCA Comments to FTC Nixing the Fix”) [https:
//perma.cc/7QGV-VLDL] [hereinafter AOCA Submission].
95. See, e.g., Automotive Delivery Services Platform, AT&T DRIVE, https://drive.att.com/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (describing the “Natural Voice Command & Control” as com-
municating with drivers); OnStar Members Tell Their Stories, ONSTAR, https://www.onstar.com
/us/en/stories [https://perma.cc/VV2H-7NCX] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (quoting a 
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tably, even communications that are delivered to the consumer in 
the form of an email, text message, or app push notification would 
be read or heard by the driver in many cases while she is in the car.
This manner of communication would surely affect the way con-
sumers process the information being delivered. It is likely the case 
that a consumer can weigh options more thoughtfully when she is 
at home in front of her computer. The use of in-car communica-
tions regarding the need for repair or maintenance may increase 
their impact and the sense of urgency, which could cause the con-
sumer to take care of the matter immediately, even if it is not nec-
essary—and, most likely, through the manufacturer’s authorized 
network.
Most importantly, it is unclear whether the consumer will have 
an effective option to turn off these notifications (or a subset of 
them) or mute them. Some sources note, for example, that Tesla’s
consumers are only offered a binary choice right now—an all-or-
nothing use of the embedded telematics system, rather than a 
more nuanced menu of choices.96 Moreover, choosing to deacti-
vate the system in its entirety may result, as specified in Tesla’s Pri-
vacy Policy, in “reduced functionality, serious damage, or inopera-
bility, and it may also disable many features of your vehicle . . . .”97
Under such terms, it is likely that most consumers would not opt 
out of the Tesla telematics service out of fear of “missing out” on 
important safety updates.
Given this, the constitutional “captive audience” doctrine could 
be applicable to the situation these consumers may face.98 While
the government generally possesses a fairly narrow authority to 
regulate speech, under the captive audience doctrine, a “captive”
listener’s right to not be exposed to speech may trump the speak-
er’s right to convey speech.99 The concerns associated with the con-
sumer’s potential inability, when sitting in her own car, to choose 
not to hear the information arguably evokes the same concerns 
member as stating, “I just remember hearing a voice . . . I felt like someone was there with 
me”).
96. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 15.
97. See Legal: Privacy, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/about/legal (click on “Learn 
More” under “Information We May Collect”) (last visited Dec. 24, 2020).
98. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The streetcar audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not of 
choice.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 960, 960–61 (1953) (reviewing the Supreme Court case of Public Utilities 
Commission v. Pollak); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS 
CON. L.Q. 85, 85–86 (1991) (citing to Kovacs v. Cooper as one of the early Supreme Court 
cases finding in favor of the captive audience, but lamenting the unclear contours of the 
doctrine).
99. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 943 (2009).
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discussed in court cases where the “captive audience” was protect-
ed.100
In addition to the method of communication, the type of infor-
mation that is communicated to the consumers via the telematics 
system further increases the need for regulatory attention in this 
arena. Repair and maintenance of cars are generally conceived of 
as matters that affect the safety of the car. While not every repair or 
maintenance task recommended by a telematics system would be 
urgent or highly concerning (for example, an oil change), the av-
erage consumer may find it difficult to distinguish between the sys-
tem’s notifications. Most of the information is technical in nature,
and a large information gap exists between the average consumer 
and car industry professionals. The inability of the average con-
sumer to evaluate the nature of the problem triggering the notifi-
cation would naturally make the consumer more prone to act as 
prescribed by the recommendations without operating much dis-
cretion. A general sense of urgency and a tendency to act pursuant 
to the system’s recommendation could be reinforced by the “scien-
tific” nature of the system, which relies on real time data extracted 
from the car.
Notably, the use of telematics to provide notifications regarding 
required repairs and maintenance could help consumers over-
come their natural tendency to procrastinate when it comes to 
these types of tasks.101 With a telematics system notifying the driver 
of the need to repair her car along with information regarding 
where she can do this and a convenient option to book the ap-
pointment right away,102 procrastination could be significantly di-
minished. While this is beneficial, an unfortunate side effect could 
be a further increase in the impact of the communications on con-
sumers, making it more likely that they would pursue repair and 
maintenance in facilities owned or linked to the manufacturer 
without considering the alternatives. These practices could thus re-
sult in a significant decrease of competition in markets for car re-
pairs.103
100. See Strauss, supra note 98, at 91–95 (discussing relevant cases).
101. Unlike an intentional avoidance of a task, procrastination usually involves postpon-
ing performance of a task that one does intend to pursue—resulting in undesirable delay or 
even non-performance. See Eyal Zamir, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir & Ilana Ritov, It’s Now or 
Never! Using Deadlines as Nudges, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 769, 772 (2017).
102. See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 77, at 23 (noting that manufacturers enable 
real-time, remote booking of vehicle check-ups).
103. This effect could be intensified where repair and recalls are linked. Typically, man-
ufacturer recalls need to be conducted by the manufacturer at an authorized repair center, 
and are done for free as an incentive to the consumers to have their car fixed. For example, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has put out “tips” to manufacturers in 
order to increase the rate of recall completion. Some of these tips direct manufacturers to 
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Moreover, when directing the consumer to repair the problem 
at an authorized dealership, it is likely that the system would not 
mention or propose any other options to the driver—certainly not 
concrete options in the proximity of the driver—and perhaps 
would even use language that implies that other options are irrele-
vant.104 The consumer could be aware of having other options to 
repair her car outside the circle of the manufacturer’s authorized 
dealerships, yet the method and manner by which the repair in-
formation is provided to the consumer, along with the possibility 
for an “instant fix,” may have a powerful impact on the driver that 
decreases the chances that the driver would resort to other op-
tions.
Furthermore, consumers receiving telematics-based information 
may believe that independent repair shops would not have the 
requisite information about the problem even if the driver tried to 
use their services. Independent repair shops report they increas-
ingly cannot access diagnostic information channeled through the 
telematics system.105 Indeed, the telematics system embedded in a 
car sends diagnostics information only to the manufacturer and its 
authorized dealers.106 To the extent consumers are aware of the 
possibility that independent mechanics may not have full access to 
such information, they may believe (rightly so) that diagnosis and 
repair at independent facilities would either be impossible or less 
efficient and more costly. Naturally, this could strengthen the ten-
dency to pursue the manufacturer’s offer without searching for 
other options.
All in all, the factors identified above are likely to have a cumula-
tive effect. The power of a manufacturer’s communications ema-
nating from the telematics system could have an overwhelming 
impact on the consumer. As a result of these practices, a consumer 
could decide to repair her car at an authorized dealership while a 
rational decision may have been to fix it elsewhere at some later 
point. For this reason, policy makers must pay close attention to 
the growing use of telematics-based advertisement of repair and 
maintenance services in order to evaluate the need to employ cer-
utilize personalized and “branded” messaging. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASS’N, TIPS 
FOR INCREASING RECALL COMPLETION RATES, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov
/files/documents/13990-recall_best_practices-041119-v2a-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALP5-
NCRP].
104. See infra note 118.
105. See Where We Live, supra note 54.
106. Car manufacturers claim that they are still providing access to independent repair 
shops through such systems under the MOU, but this is rebutted by independent repair 
shops. See id. For a detailed discussion of the problematic aspects of the manufacturers’ con-
trol of the diagnostic information produced by cars, see infra Part III.
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tain measures that would preserve competition in the relevant 
markets and protect consumers from being misled, deceived, or 
coerced by these practices.
B. Looking to Consumer Protection Law for Possible Solutions
As stated above, the new developments in diagnostics and 
telematics have potentially great benefits—the main one of which 
is enhancing safety by promoting preventive maintenance and 
timely repairs. Therefore, this Article does not call for the adop-
tion of aggressive regulatory measures in this context, and certainly 
not an outright ban of telematics-based advertising. Due to the ear-
ly stage of the telematics-based advertising industry, there is also a 
large measure of uncertainty as to the industry’s future directions. 
As a result, this Article’s proposals are of a tentative nature at this 
stage.
The body of law that seems most suitable to deal with the issues 
triggered by telematics-based advertising is consumer protection 
law.107 Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), unfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce are considered unlawful, and the FTC is 
empowered and directed to prevent their use.108 Looking first at 
the second prong of § 45(a), which constitutes the basis for false 
advertising law, the question arises: Could the practices described 
above be characterized as a type of deceptive advertising?
1.  False Advertising 
At first look, one may wonder whether communications regard-
ing the need to maintain and repair cars are to be considered a 
form of advertising at all. It would be one thing if car manufactur-
ers were merely providing information about the status of the car 
and pointing out the need for repairs or maintenance without try-
ing to market their own products and services. Yet, to the extent 
that the communications delivered by the telematics system pro-
mote the manufacturer’s business and seek to pitch its products 
and services to the driver, this Article contends that such commu-
107. Cf. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 862 (noting that consumer protection law fo-
cuses on individual harms and consumer rights but can also broadly promote functioning 
free markets and innovation).
108. Alongside federal law, there are state consumer protection laws, which mirror this 
prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. See REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN,
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 81 (4th ed. 2019).
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nications should be considered advertising and evaluated as such 
by the responsible authorities. Classifying something as advertising 
may not always be straightforward,109 but policy makers should em-
ploy flexibility in this regard and devote regulatory attention to 
new practices of attention-getting.110 As noted by Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet in a different context: “Advertising is protean where law is 
not. But advertising is not special that way; the problem of adapt-
ing to new variants of behavior, some shaped precisely to avoid 
regulation, is a typical one and need not defeat the law.”111
Classifying telematics-based communications by manufacturers 
as a form of advertising, or more generally as “commercial speech,”
has importance not only in bringing such speech under the pur-
view of false advertising law but also, more generally, in determin-
ing the level of First Amendment scrutiny to which the regulation 
of these practices would be subject.112 To the extent the practices 
discussed in this Article are essentially a form of advertising, any 
regulation of such practices could most likely pass constitutional 
muster more easily.113
Assuming now, for purposes of this discussion, that telematics-
based notifications by car manufacturers could indeed be consid-
ered a form of advertising, a separate inquiry under false advertis-
ing law has to do with whether such notifications have a deceptive 
nature. Clearly, not all of them do, but some may. Generally speak-
ing, the relevant question is how consumers perceive the advertis-
er’s message.114 This is, of course, dependent not only on the sub-
stantive content but also on the way the message is phrased and 
conveyed, the medium used to deliver the message, and other rele-
vant circumstances.115 As the practices of different companies are 
not identical and are naturally subject to constant changes, this 
109. Id. at 12.
110. See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, 
and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 723, 731 (2010) (discussing the need to 
devote attention under false advertising law to new practices of attention-getting); Alexan-
dra J. Roberts, False Influencing, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the need to 
regulate influencer marketing as a type of advertising).
111. Tushnet, supra note 110, at 791.
112. Commercial speech is more generally regulated than other types of speech and re-
ceives reduced constitutional protection. TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 12. While 
false advertising is not protected by the First Amendment at all, regulation of non-
misleading commercial speech is subject to an intermediate level of First Amendment scru-
tiny, in contrast to the strict scrutiny framework that applies to other types of speech. See 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); TUSHNET &
GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 20.
113. See also supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the “captive audi-
ence” doctrine, which may serve to further justify regulation of speech in this context).
114. TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 9.
115. See id. at 6 (“[C]onsumer response to advertising varies based on the advertising 
medium.”).
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type of determination cannot be done in a general manner. The 
deception could be, for instance, in regard to the level of urgency 
or importance of performing the repair or the need to perform it 
at the specified facility associated with the manufacturer.
Notably, the definition of deception in the context of false ad-
vertising law is not confined to claims that are explicitly false;116
omitting information can be deceptive as well.117 In the context 
discussed herein, the failure to propose, or even to mention the 
existence of, other options where consumers can perform a re-
quired maintenance or repair task may have a significant impact 
on them. This omission can undermine consumers’ freedom to 
choose where to repair their cars, even though they typically hold
general knowledge about such options. Thus, this may be consid-
ered a deceptive omission in this context.118
Another element of deception that may be exhibited in telemat-
ics-based communications could relate to their very nature as ad-
vertisements. As noted above, these communications may not 
come off at all as advertising on their face, and many consumers 
may simply not be aware of the fact that they are essentially receiv-
ing a promotional message. This is problematic, as consumers may 
regularly employ certain filters with respect to advertising but are 
not likely to do so when encountering a new form of advertising 
that is disguised as something else.119 For this reason, making sure 
that consumers are aware of their exposure to advertising is highly 
important.120 In the context discussed herein, masking the promo-
tional nature of the communications at hand can also make them 
appear more authoritative (like a doctor’s prescription) in the eyes 
of the consumer and obscures the fact that the consumer may ac-
tually have leeway in choosing when and where to fix her car.
Altogether, when evaluating telematics-based advertising of re-
pair and maintenance services, policy makers must consider the 
context and the unique characteristics of these practices that could 
116. Id. at 101.
117. Id.
118. Cf. AOCA Submission, supra note 94, at 14 (noting, as an example for a restrictive 
practice, Hyundai 2017 Elantra owner’s manual command form language: “Have engine oil 
and filter changed by an authorized Hyundai dealer . . . ,” which is not accompanied by an 
acknowledgement of the consumer’s option to use any other service provider).
119. See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 730 (describing the market dynamics leading to ad-
vertisers employing “methods that don’t let audiences know an ad is coming” and noting 
that our filters can be defeated by such new forms of advertising).
120. See id. at 731; Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 
1189 (2006) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 
1963)) (stating that consumers “routinely say that they want to know when content is mar-
keting”).
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make this form of advertising extremely powerful—perhaps even 
close to coercive.121
2. Unfair Practices
As noted above, the FTC is not only authorized to enforce 
against deception but also against “unfair” trade acts.122 Unfairness 
requires that “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause sub-
stantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not out-weighed by countervailing ben-
efits to consumers or to competition.”123 Thus, even practices that 
do not count as deceptive advertising need to be evaluated for 
their fairness. On top of the factors and circumstances highlighted 
above, in evaluating the manufacturers’ practices from a fairness 
perspective, it is essential to keep in mind other ways in which car 
manufacturers restrict or limit third-party repairs—for instance, by 
registering and enforcing design patents over replacement parts.124
Notably, the FTC has recently started to study restrictions on re-
pairs.125 Due to the importance of preserving a meaningful right to 
repair,126 the FTC should expand its efforts in this vein and oversee 
the use of telematics to ensure that it does not end up suppressing
auto repairs.
3.  Other Legislative Measures
Alongside the general jurisdiction of the FTC (and comparable 
state agencies) to regulate deceptive and unfair practices, it might 
be advisable to consider enacting specific consumer protection leg-
islation to regulate certain aspects of the practices described above. 
The law could require, for instance, that the interface design al-
lows consumers to easily search for other repair options. In addi-
tion, it could impose some type of a disclosure requirement re-
garding the promotional nature of the communications emanating 
121. For the need to evaluate advertising in its context, see TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra
note 108, at 143. See also Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz. Corp., 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 
1986) (noting that a court must view the entire mosaic of the advertisement rather than 
each tile separately).
122. See TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 53 and accompanying text.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 108, at 53.
124. See supra note 55.
125. See FTC Workshop, supra note 19. As an example for repair restrictions in the au-
tomobile industry, see AOCA Submission, supra note 94, which details various types of repair 
restrictions.
126. For discussion, see supra Section I.A.
310 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:2
from the telematics system.127 In addition, it might be sensible to 
require that the cost of services advertised by the system be con-
spicuously presented to consumers. Another dimension that the 
law could address is the method of communication. Policy makers 
should consider disallowing certain forms of in-car messaging, to 
the extent this can be done without compromising the functionali-
ty of the system. Additionally, a more meaningful choice should be 
provided to consumers regarding the type of notifications they re-
ceive and their method of delivery.128
Unfortunately, manufacturers are not only enjoying a significant 
marketing advantage as a result of their control of telematics sys-
tems but are also making competition much harder by restricting 
access to diagnostic information. Part III discusses this in detail.
III. ACCESS FOR ALL: THE NEED TO ACCESS TELEMATICS
As discussed above in Part I, Massachusetts passed an automo-
bile right to repair law in 2012.129 Following this legislation, car 
makers and repair shops entered into a national MOU that stand-
ardized the way car diagnostic information could be accessed by all 
mechanics, authorized or independent.130 Now that the MOU is in 
place, manufacturer diagnostic tools, including the software and 
diagnostic codes, must be available for purchase on “fair and rea-
sonable terms.”131 The level of compliance with the MOU apparent-
ly varies between different car makers.132 In addition, transaction 
costs for shop owners can be high, particularly when they service 
more than one brand of car, requiring them to search for available 
information on each manufacturer’s website133 and purchase a va-
127. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 110, at 728 
(noting that commercial speakers can be forced to disclose relevant information to avoid 
consumer deception).
128. As noted above, this is not the current situation, at least with respect to certain 
manufacturers. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K (2019); see also Ng, supra note 49.
130. See A “Right to Repair” Movement Tools Up, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2017), https:
//www.economist.com/business/2017/09/30/a-right-to-repair-movement-tools-up [https:
//perma.cc/H5ZS-SHYP ] (“The hope is that once an important state passes such a law, the 
country will follow—as was the case in the car industry after Massachusetts in 2012 passed a 
right to repair law for cars that led to a national memorandum of understanding between 
carmakers and repair shops.”).
131. MOU, supra note 9.
132. See Schueller, supra note 47 (noting that most members are “attempting to comply 
on some level,” but some “were reluctant to follow the MOU and chose to be selective in 
what software they offered”).
133. Notably, though, for vehicles manufactured in 2018 and beyond, under Section 
2(c) to the MOU, supra note 9, OEMs must provide access to the diagnostic information by 
utilizing a vehicle communications interface that would act as a universal scan tool that will 
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riety of diagnostic tools and individual subscriptions for each man-
ufacturer’s software.134 Yet, all in all, the industry has moved a long 
way towards reaching a status quo that seemed to have been mostly 
satisfying for all parties involved.
Now, with the spread of telematics, the concern is that this equi-
librium is about to change. As noted above, in the last few years, 
more and more new models of cars are manufactured with a 
telematics system, enabling wireless transmission of data between 
the car and the manufacturer.135 With a telematics system embed-
ded in the vehicle, diagnostic data from various car modules could 
be gathered in a gateway and sent directly to the manufacturer, in 
an encrypted format, while remaining non-accessible to others.136
Information transmitted via the telematics system cannot be easily 
extracted from the vehicle by third parties, not only because it is 
encrypted but also for lack of standardization in the hardware and 
software components of telematics systems.137
And, unfortunately, the 2012 Massachusetts law and MOU do 
not accommodate or respond to this development and do not 
guarantee access to wirelessly-transmitted data.138 The manufactur-
ers’ current obligations to provide standardized access to diagnos-
tic information do not apply to “telematics services or any other 
remote or information service, diagnostic or otherwise, delivered 
to or derived from a motor vehicle by mobile communications.”139
There is an exception to this carve-out, obligating the manufactur-
ers to provide access to the extent it is “necessary to diagnose and 
repair a customer’s vehicle and not otherwise available to an inde-
pendent repair facility” via the diagnostic tools offered to purchase 
by the manufacturer.140 The term “necessary,” however, could plau-
sibly be construed narrowly by manufacturers to exclude various 
types of repair and diagnostic information. In addition, absent ac-
cess to the telematic feed, it could be difficult to discern what in-
formation manufacturers fail to provide access to, and as a result, 
detecting and proving a breach of the manufacturers’ obligations
extract repair diagnostic codes from any make or model, and thus eliminate the need for 
the purchase of OEM diagnostics scanning tools.
134. And hence, the need for universal scanning tools that can be used for diagnosis of 
vehicles made by different manufacturers. This was the nature of the tool developed by 
Autel, which triggered the litigation discussed infra notes 178–88 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Glenn Wilder, Opinion, Your View: Right to Repair Needs Update, PATRIOT 
LEDGER (June 6, 2019), https://www.patriotledger.com/opinion/20190606/your-view-right-
to-repair-needs-update [https://perma.cc/T92U-D76K ] (expecting that by 2020, “more 
than 90 percent of new cars will transmit real-time repair information wirelessly”).
136. See, e.g., MEMA Submission, supra note 43, at 14.
137. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
138. Section 2(e) of the R2R Agreement attached to the MOU, supra note 9.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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could be challenging. Some independent mechanics report their 
struggle to access diagnostic information they once had access to is 
triggering serious and wide-spread concern that the switch to 
telematics is making the MOU and the 2012 Massachusetts law ob-
solete.141
Utilizing new technological developments to avoid the spirit of 
the law and the governing private ordering regime should not be 
permitted. In order to deal with this emerging reality, states need 
to update automobile repair legislation and mandate that car 
manufacturers supply standardized access to telematics and soft-
ware on reasonable terms. In addition, as the discussion below will 
explore, lawmakers should consider certain changes to intellectual 
property laws so that manufacturers cannot use them as another 
means to bar access to their telematics systems and diagnostic data.
Enabling reasonable access to diagnostics would not only allow 
independent repair shops to operate but could also lessen the anti-
competitive impact resulting from the manufacturers’ control of 
the telematics system for marketing purposes.142 Currently, drivers 
may simply rule out the possibility of taking their cars to inde-
pendent repair shops, knowing that such shops do not have access 
to diagnostics. Enabling third parties to access diagnostics may 
cause drivers to consider other options more often, even in the 
face of aggressive marketing on behalf of the original manufactur-
ers.
A. Updating Automobile Repair Legislation
Considering all the above, this Article supports the new amend-
ments that update Massachusetts’s 2012 right to repair law to bet-
ter address the growing use of telematics in vehicle diagnostics and 
repair.143 Given that Massachusetts voters approved such legislation
141. See Where We Live, supra note 54 (interviewing independent mechanic); Baystate 
Business: Police Reform, BLOOMBERG, at 18:42 (June 11, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/audio/2020-06-11/baystate-business-police-reform-radio; supra notes 67–68 and ac-
companying text.
142. See discussion supra Part II.
143. Massachusetts voters approved a ballot initiative in November 2020 to amend the 
2012 law. Brandon Bigelow & Dallin Wilson, Mass. Voters Expand Right to Repair Law: Is Past 
Prologue or Will OEMs Be Forced to Fight Back?, JD SUPRA (Nov. 12, 2020), https:
//www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mass-voters-expand-right-to-repair-law-33686 [https://
perma.cc/SKG5-547N]. The ballot initiative is almost identical to a 2019 bill: An Act to En-
hance, Update and Protect the 2013 Motor Vehicle Right to Repair Law and Consumer 
Rights, H. 340, 191st Gen Ct. (Mass. 2019). Because the state legislature did not pass the bill 
by the end of the term, Bill H.340, MALEGISLATURE.GOV, https://malegislature.gov/Bills
/191/H340 (last visited Dec. 26, 2020), proponents of the update instead managed to put 
the law on the November ballot for Massachusetts voters to vote on during the 2020 
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in November 2020, other states may follow suit, or an amended 
MOU with the car industry could emerge.144
The core provision of the amendments would eliminate the 
telematics carve-out described above145 and require a manufacturer 
of vehicles that utilizes a telematics system, starting with model year 
2022 and thereafter, to equip such vehicles with an “inter-operable, 
standardized and open access platform across all of the manufac-
turer’s makes and models.”146 The amendments clarify that “[s]uch 
platform shall be capable of securely communicating all mechani-
cal data emanating directly from the motor vehicle via direct data 
connection to the platform.”147 This secure platform “shall be di-
rectly accessible by the owner of the vehicle through a mobile-
based application.”148 An “owner” of a vehicle is defined, in the 
original Massachusetts act, as a person or business who owns or 
leases the vehicle.149 Most importantly, an owner would also have a 
right to authorize an independent repair facility to access the vehi-
cle’s mechanical data for the purposes of maintaining, diagnosing, 
or repairing the vehicle.150 To avoid any doubt, the amendments
also clarify that “[a]ccess shall include the ability to send com-
mands to in-vehicle components if needed for purposes of mainte-
nance, diagnostics and repair.”151
Having these amendments adopted by the Massachusetts voters 
goes a long way towards maintaining the ability of independent re-
pair shops to access diagnostic data in Massachusetts. While this 
Article supports this direction, it does not opine on whether the 
elections. See CTR. FOR STATE POL’Y ANALYSIS, A GUIDE TO MASSACHUSETTS QUESTION 1:
EXPANDING THE RIGHT TO REPAIR LAW 3 (Oct. 2020), https://tischcollege.tufts.edu/sites
/default/files/cSPA_right_to_repair.pdf [https://perma.cc/A96Y-8TC4]. Given that the bill 
and the ballot initiative are almost the same, this section will not differentiate between the 
two and uses the term “law” to reference both the bill and the initiative. Although the initia-
tive was passed by Massachusetts voters in the November 2020 election, the legislature could 
still take action to amend the new law. See id. at 5; Bigelow & Wilson, supra.
144. But see Bigelow & Wilson, supra note 143 (expressing doubts as to the likelihood of 
striking a nation-wide deal by the time the amendments are set to become effective).
145. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146. H.340 § 3. The proposed bill and the ballot initiative have slightly different defini-
tions of what a telematics system constitutes. The following is the definition of a “telematics 
system” as provided for in the ballot initiative: “any system in a motor vehicle that collects 
information generated by the operation of the vehicle and transmits such information, in 
this chapter referred to as ‘telematics system data,’ utilizing wireless communications to a 
remote receiving point where it is stored.” SEC’Y. OF THE COMMONWEALTH, MASSACHUSETTS 
INFORMATION FOR VOTERS: 2020 BALLOT QUESTIONS 5 (2020), https://www.sec.state.ma.us
/ele/elepdf/IFV_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8JS-J24Z].
147. Id. “Mechanical Data” is defined in section 1 as “any telematics data in a vehicle re-
lated to the diagnosis, repair or maintenance of that vehicle.”
148. H.340 § 3.
149. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 1 (2019).
150. H.340 § 3.
151. Id.
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law’s specific solution—a secure platform and a mobile-based ap-
plication—is necessarily the best way to address the concern re-
garding hindered access to diagnostic information. It might very 
well be, but this Article does not rule out the possibility that there 
may be other good technological solutions to alleviate this con-
cern. In addition, some aspects not yet addressed by the amend-
ments perhaps should be considered, including the possibility of 
allowing third parties to market their repair and maintenance ser-
vices via the platform to the same extent authorized dealers are 
permitted to do so.
While one of the goals of the new law is to spur similar amend-
ments to the nationwide MOU, if, for some reason, this does not 
happen, a more modest alternative should be considered. For in-
stance, even if they do not get real-time access to telematics diag-
nostic information, consumers and independent mechanics should 
nonetheless be permitted to connect to the telematics system after 
the fact. In order to reduce costs, this connection should prefera-
bly be done through a standard non-proprietary interface that 
connects to a vehicle’s telematics gateway. While this would not 
eliminate the competitive advantage of the manufacturers result-
ing from their exclusive access to real-time information, such a so-
lution would at least enable independent mechanics to extract all 
relevant data if and when the vehicle arrives at their shop. Similar-
ly, an amended MOU could clarify and explicitly require that all 
telematics information useful for diagnosis and repair be made 
available through the OBD port.152
B. Intellectual Property Law Considerations
Critically, in order to effectively promote competitive access to 
diagnostic and repair information, it may not be sufficient to enact 
state consumer protection laws, as certain intellectual property im-
plications must be considered as well.153 This Section addresses 
such potential implications in connection with two different 
branches of intellectual property law: copyright law and trademark 
law. 
152. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
153. For a thorough treatment of the interface between intellectual property law and the 
right to repair consumer products, see Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 90–123.
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1.  Copyright Law
Markedly, software components of a telematics-based system for 
diagnostics are likely to be subject to copyright protection.154 In 
addition to the software, various data compilations contained in 
the system could be protected, provided that the “selection, coor-
dination, and arrangement” of the data meet the originality re-
quirement of copyright law.155 Hence, in requiring access to the 
telematics system and data, the new Massachusetts law might impli-
cate federal copyright law. Notably, when a state law attempts to 
circumvent or interfere with the underlying goals of a federal law,
preemption concerns may arise.156
Likely more concerning, however, is that manufacturers can uti-
lize copyright law, along with contractual restrictions, to effectively 
bar access to components of their systems.157 To the extent there is 
a gap between diagnostic and repair data available to manufactur-
ers and those available to consumers and independent repair 
shops, independent mechanics can only continue operating by in-
dependently retrieving data from vehicles using third party diag-
nostic tools.158 Yet, any unauthorized copying or adaptation of cop-
yrighted software or other components by independent shops or 
tools developers may trigger copyright liability.159
154. It is possible that patents may also protect similar items.
155. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991); see also Auto 
Care Ass’n, supra note 61 (arguing that “data collected through telematics systems is crea-
tively arranged to support innovative telematics systems”). Notably, the underlying data are 
not protected by copyright and may be freely copied. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 360. As to 
ownership of data, see also discussion infra Section IV.B.
156. Under the preemption doctrine, in case of a conflict between a state law and a fed-
eral one, the federal law controls and the state law must be struck down as preempted. See, 
e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent-Laws, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 158 
(2018) (“ ‘Preemption’ generally describes a situation in which federal law ‘preempts,’ or 
supersedes, a state or local law.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, Contracting for a Return to the USPTO: 
Inter Partes Reexaminations as the Exclusive Outlet for Licensee Challenges to Patent Validity, 51 
IDEA 309, 317 (2011) (noting that under the preemption doctrine, in case of a conflict be-
tween federal and state law, the federal law controls and the state law is invalidated). 
Preemption analysis is typically conducted under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the 
Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the Supreme Law of 
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwith-
standing.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Notably, the 2012 Massachusetts Right to Repair Act 
already implicated federal copyright law in a similar manner (to the extent it obligates man-
ufacturers to make available copyrighted software), and we are not aware of any constitu-
tional challenges that have been raised in this respect.
157. See discussion infra Section III.C.
158. The availability of third-party tools could also be highly beneficial for independent 
shops even if proprietary diagnostic tools capable of extracting all necessary data are offered 
for purchase by manufacturers, as such tools can typically operate across multiple platforms, 
and thus save the need to purchase separate tools and software subscriptions. See supra note 
69 and accompanying text.
159. This issue has come up in the Ford v. Autel litigation discussed infra notes 178–88 
and accompanying text.
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Although copyright law recognizes an exemption for the copy-
ing or adaptation of software that is created as an essential step in 
connection with its use, this exemption does not seem to include 
the scenarios discussed in this Article.160 Furthermore, this exemp-
tion is restricted to copies made or authorized by the owner of a 
copy of a computer program, and vehicle owners are not likely the 
owners of the software copies embedded in their cars.161 In fact, 
makers of devices that rely on embedded software code for their 
functionality, including cars, often preserve ownership in copies of 
the software, while device owners are considered mere licensees.162
This position has been adopted, for instance, by John Deere and
General Motors with respect to their vehicles.163 Similarly, in a 
comment to the Copyright Office, the Auto Alliance recently main-
tained that many telematics systems are subject to license agree-
ments that “clearly show the user does not own the copyrighted 
software.”164 Courts have backed up this position by upholding li-
cense agreements specifying that a software user does not own the 
copy but is merely a licensee.165 Thus, it seems that consumers, re-
pair shops, and independent tool makers who copy elements of 
proprietary diagnostic software, even in the course of repair, are 
not covered by the Copyright Act’s software exemptions. It is also 
not clear whether § 107 of the Copyright Act (the “fair use” provi-
sion) would be applicable in these cases;166 and due to the inherent 
uncertainty involved in fair use determination, it certainly cannot 
be relied upon by any of the parties we are concerned with.167
160. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). Another provision in the Copyright Act includes a specific 
repair exemption that allows the owner of a machine to make copies of software in the 
course of maintaining or repairing the machine. See id. § 117(c). It is unlikely that a con-
sumer or independent mechanic would be copying the car’s software in the course of re-
pairing the car. A more likely scenario for copying of diagnostic software would be a third 
party attempting to develop diagnostic tools, and such attempts would not fall within this 
exemption.
161. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 88, at 798 (noting that rights under Section 117 of 
the Copyright Act are limited to owners of copies of software).
162. Id.
163. Id.; Newman, supra note 91.
164. Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61, at 11.
165. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a software program where the cop-
yright owner specifies that the user is granted a license and imposes significant transfer and 
use restrictions).
166. Section 107 of the Copyright Act has a four factor test that judges are required to 
consider and balance. One of the factors is the impact on the market of the copyrighted 
work, here, the software. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Given that there would be an adverse (but pro-
competitive) impact on the market, this would not necessarily be deemed to be fair use.
167. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575 (2008) (reporting that 30.4% of preliminary injunctions 
found in favor of fair use and 24.1% of bench trial opinions did).
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In light of the above, there is a need for action at the federal 
level to provide a “safe harbor” from liability (or, at the very least, a 
compulsory license regime) for certain uses of copyrighted works 
needed to enable vehicle diagnostics and repair, to the extent 
manufacturers do not provide reasonable access to such works. 
While such a regime would limit the possibility of enforcing copy-
right against independent repairers and diagnostic tool makers, 
manufacturers would still be able to assert their copyright in com-
ponents of the telematics system against other car manufacturers 
incorporating such components in their own systems. In any event, 
market exclusivity may not be needed at all to incentivize manufac-
turers to invest in diagnostic and telematic systems, which allow 
them to offer better services to their customers.
Another area of copyright law that needs to be revised to sup-
port a competitive diagnostics and repair market is § 1201 of the 
Copyright Act, which sets the legal basis on which manufacturers 
are able to control access to their telematics systems through the 
use of TPMs.168 Even if disabling such locks is technologically feasi-
ble, § 1201 prevents anyone from disabling a TPM that a copyright 
owner has placed on a work in order to protect its copyrighted 
works.169 On top of civil liability, if the disabling of a TPM is done 
willfully and for commercial gain, the circumventer may be crimi-
nally liable.170
Fortunately, § 1201 authorizes the Librarian of Congress, upon 
the recommendation of the Copyright Office, to adopt temporary 
exemptions (valid for three years) to these strict prohibitions in
certain circumstances.171 As part of the latest exemptions an-
nounced in 2018, following a thorough rulemaking proceeding,172
the Librarian of Congress renewed and expanded an exemption 
that allows persons who engage in non-infringing uses of software 
contained in, and controlling the function of, a lawfully acquired 
motorized land vehicle, to circumvent TPMs for purposes of diag-
nosis, repair, or modification of a vehicle function.173 As part of the 
renewed exemption, the Librarian of Congress removed a limita-
tion prohibiting circumvention of TPMs to access computer pro-
168. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; Auto Care Ass’n, supra note 61 (discussing 
the burden posed by the current access to TPMs on independent servicers).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
170. Id. § 1204.
171. Id. § 1201.
172. See Section 1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of Technological 
Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (2018), https://www.copyright.gov
/1201/2018 [https://perma.cc/HK8F-3EKU].
173. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,010, 54,014 (Oct. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 
37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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grams primarily designed for the control of telematics systems. 
Thus, disabling TPMs to gain access to diagnostic data from the 
telematics module of the car is now permitted for purposes of re-
pair of the car. However, a proposal to expand the exemption so 
that it also permits diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of the 
telematics system itself was rejected. This means that tweaking the 
telematics system so that it transmits diagnostic information to a 
mechanic chosen by the vehicle owner is not permitted under this 
exemption.
Although consumers can now legally bypass TPMs on their 
telematics systems by virtue of the renewed exemption, this does 
not mean that third party mechanics or diagnostic tool makers 
could do so as well. While a requirement that circumvention be 
“undertaken by the authorized owner” of the vehicle was removed
as part of the renewed exemption,174 the Copyright Office declined 
to explicitly extend the exemption to third parties. In fact, disa-
blement of TPMs by independent mechanics and diagnostic tool 
makers may implicate § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b) of the Copyright 
Act (the “DMCA anti-trafficking provisions”), which prohibit the 
manufacturing or trafficking of circumvention tools and the provi-
sion of circumvention services. Only Congress is authorized to pro-
vide exemptions in this respect. Thus, in its recommendation lead-
ing to the enactment of the § 1201 exemptions, the Copyright 
Office clarified that “[g]iven the legal uncertainty in this area, ser-
vices electing to proceed with circumvention activity pursuant to 
the exemption do so at their peril.”175 This is unfortunate in terms 
of enabling a meaningful right to repair. Indeed, the Copyright 
Office acknowledged the argument made by repair proponents 
that many consumers would not be able to take advantage of the 
exemption if they were not able to utilize third-party assistance.176
Therefore, while the 2018 exemption was a win for the repair 
industry, it was a muted win and leaves open room for additional 
regulatory intervention. The temporary nature of the exemption is 
yet another downside, and the Copyright Office could be persuad-
ed in future years not to renew it.177 Our analysis supports the con-
174. Id. at 54,022.
175. SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING PROCEEDING, supra note 28, at 225.
176. Id.
177. This concern is not theoretical. On past occasions, the Copyright Office has decid-
ed not to renew much needed exemptions, including the “unlocking” exemption that had 
been provided from 2006 to 2012 to allow consumers to connect their wireless devices to an 
alternative network. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protec-
tion Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260, 65,264–66 (Oct. 26, 
2012) (describing the history and subsequent narrowing of the unlocking exemption). It 
took an act of Congress to overturn the denial of the exemption. See Unlocking Consumer 
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tinuing renewal of the exemption, though ultimately, we call for a 
permanent and more encompassing enactment of such an exemp-
tion by Congress.
2.  Trademark Law
Another area where intellectual property rights could create ob-
stacles to competition in the market for diagnostic tools has to do 
with trademark law. One recent case highlights this issue: Ford Mo-
tors sued Autel, an independent manufacturer of diagnostic scan-
ners. One of Ford’s allegations claimed Autel infringed upon its 
trademarks by including them on the electronic menu screen of its 
diagnostic tool along with other logos. Ford argued that this use 
causes a likelihood of confusion as to the source of Autel’s diag-
nostic tool.178 In addition, Ford pleaded dilution through blurring 
and tarnishment, due to the associations that Autel’s customers 
could make through its diagnostic tool because the use of the Ford 
logo arguably linked Ford and Autel.179
While courts have developed the doctrine of “nominative fair 
use” in trademark law,180 and “descriptive fair use” is a statutory de-
fense to trademark infringement,181 the court did not dismiss the 
pleadings.182 These defenses ordinarily allow third parties to utilize 
others’ trademarks to the extent necessary to communicate infor-
mation to consumers regarding their businesses.183 Under these 
doctrines, courts have held that using original manufacturers’
word marks in similar contexts—including by repair shops and 
parts resellers—is noninfringing.184 Where a use is made of the 
original manufacturer’s logo (or “stylized” mark), however, as in 
Autel’s case, courts more readily find trademark infringement.185
Unfortunately, this was likely the message Autel received because 
Choice and Wireless Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 113-144, 128 Stat. 1751 (2014) (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
178. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–8 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
179. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2016 WL 3569541, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
July 1, 2016).
180. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977, 1997 
(2019) (describing the nominative fair use defense).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
182. Ford Motor Co., 2015 WL 5729067, at *9 (noting that the use of Ford’s logo was a 
factor leading it to not apply precedential cases and grant Autel’s motion to dismiss).
183. See Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Toyota is not entitled to a wholesale injunction against a broker of genuine Lexus cars).
184. See id.
185. See Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(upholding an injunction in part on the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trade dress).
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Autel eventually settled the case with Ford.186 Ultimately, based on 
Autel’s website, it appears that the settlement allowed Autel to con-
tinue to use Ford’s name but not its logo.187
Although Autel’s business may not have suffered greatly from 
this multi-year litigation, when manufacturers enforce their trade-
marks against independent repair shops, which are likely to be 
small businesses or sole proprietorships, the problem can be exac-
erbated. While Autel had the wherewithal to likely negotiate for 
the ability to use the plain text word “Ford” to indicate its products 
were compatible with Ford cars (and which nominative fair use 
clearly covers), independent repair shops may not know this or 
have access to lawyers who can advise them of this. Therefore, 
when they receive cease-and-desist letters claiming that the inde-
pendent repair shop cannot refer to the manufacturer at all (not 
even in plain text), the repair shop owner will likely cede to the 
demands in order to not get caught up in a costly and emotional 
legal battle.188
There is serious need for clarity regarding the scope of trade-
mark rights and the consequences of unfounded claims of in-
fringement. Some relief might come in the form of a state law 
providing a cause of action to address “abusive threats” made by 
manufacturers.189 In addition, in today’s image-heavy world, more 
thought needs to be given to judges’ predispositions toward allow-
ing the use of plain text and not of trademark logos.190 It is ques-
tionable whether the use of the plain text allows third parties to 
compete as well as other licensed entities who are entitled to use 
the logos.191
C. Regulating Contractual Practices
Contract law provides one area where state legislatures and 
courts could be forward-thinking. Given that almost all software 
186. Stipulated Motion to Dismiss, Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc, No. 4:14cv13760-
TGB-MJH (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2017), 2017 WL 4391922.
187. See Database of Coverage of Autel’s Scanners, http://www.maxitpms.com/get
Coverage.jspx (select “US” from the “Market” dropdown) (showing Ford as one of the mod-
els under Make and Model); Product Display of MaxiSys, AUTEL ONLINE STORE, https:
//www.autelonline.com/autel-ms908cv-maxisys-cv-heavy-duty-diagnostic-scan-tool-with-j-
2534-ecu-coding-programming_p76.html [https://perma.cc/XEF4-JWLC] (showing the 
names of the car companies, not the logos).
188. See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV.
409, 414–18 (2015) (discussing the cease-and-desist process).
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Hypertherm, 832 F.2d at 701 (upholding an injunction in part on the de-
fendant’s use of plaintiff’s trade dress).
191. Due to space limitations, this question is left for another day.
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systems are licensed to consumers, there is typically an End User 
License Agreement (EULA) attached to it. By using the software 
(for example, by purchasing or leasing the vehicle, and then driv-
ing the car), a consumer is agreeing to abide by the terms of the 
EULA, which often contain use restrictions on how the consumer 
should use the software. For example, farm equipment sold by 
John Deere is accompanied by a license agreement that prevents 
consumers from accessing the software embedded in the equip-
ment and prohibits any repairs other than those made by author-
ized repair providers.192
Ford’s lawsuit against Autel also illustrates how manufacturers 
have utilized these EULAs to protect their systems.193 In addition to 
the trademark infringement and other intellectual property claims, 
Ford argued that Autel purchased Ford’s proprietary diagnostic 
scanner and used it in violation of the EULA, which prohibited re-
verse engineering while also providing that an “End-User” cannot 
be a “diagnostic toolmaker.”194 Notably, copying or making an ad-
aptation of a copyrighted software program while exceeding the 
terms of a software license does not only involve a breach of con-
tract but could also constitute copyright infringement.195
Contract law, though, is state-based and also subject to judicial
interpretation. This means that states can curb certain uses of con-
tract they deem to be anti-competitive through measures limiting 
what manufacturers can include in their EULAs. In addition, in 
light of the strong policy considerations favoring access to diagnos-
tic information, perhaps courts should consider viewing such re-
strictions as constituting “unclean hands,” or a form of copyright 
misuse.196 Finally, certain contractual restrictions that seek to inhib-
it competition in markets for diagnostic tools and repairs could 
run afoul of federal antitrust law as agreements in unlawful re-
192. See Jason Bloomberg, John Deere’s Digital Transformation Runs Afoul of Right-to-Repair 
Movement, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/20
17/04/30/john-deeres-digital-transformation-runs-afoul-of-right-to-repair-movement [https:
//perma.cc/4WSD-8K68].
193. See supra notes 178–88 and accompanying discussion.
194. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2016 WL 3569541, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 
July 1, 2016); see also GM LLC v. Dorman Prods., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135721 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 30, 2016) (for an argument that copying of software constituted a violation of the gov-
erning EULA).
195. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (providing to the copyright owner the exclusive right to 
copy and prepare derivative works from their copyrighted work).
196. For the copyright misuse doctrine, see, for example, Brett Frischman & Dan Moy-
lan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application 
to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000); and Chip Patterson, Copyright Misuse and Mod-
ified Copyleft: New Solutions to the Challenges of Internet Standardization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1351 
(2000).
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straint of trade.197 As we have noted, the FTC has begun an investi-
gation into the car repair industry, and hopefully their investiga-
tion will bring solutions to advance competition in this arena.198
IV. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
We recognize the repair movement is controversial. The efforts 
for and against the original Massachusetts repair act were wide-
ranging, and the efforts to pass a revised version (or fight against 
such passage), have been no different.199 In this Part, we attempt to 
proactively address some of the arguments that could be used to 
argue against an expanded right to repair law that would encom-
pass data transmitted via telematics systems.
A. Everything Is a Trade Secret
One of the oft-cited challenges to a right to repair for cars, or 
even more broadly, electronics, is that manufacturers would be 
forced to disclose trade secrets if legislatures mandated they pro-
vide access to repair information.200 A trade secret is generally de-
fined as information that: (1) its owner has taken reasonable steps 
to keep secret, and (2) derives an actual or potential independent 
economic value from being a secret.201 To accommodate this con-
197. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract . . . in restraint of 
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”). Some commentators have opined that 
state antitrust law needs to “parallel” federal law, meaning that what is illegal under federal 
antitrust law can be illegal as well under state law. See Richard A. Samp, The Role of State Anti-
trust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 149, 149–50 (2014). For a his-
tory of the relationship between state and federal antitrust law, see generally Herbert 
Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375 (1983).
198. As noted above, the FTC has authority to investigate and pursue actions against en-
tities engaging in unfair competitive practices, as well as those that harm consumers. See su-
pra note 108 and accompanying text.
199. Right to Repair collected over 100,000 signatures in order to be on the ballot for 
Massachusetts voters to vote on in 2020. See Press Release, The Massachusetts Right to Repair 
Coalition, Needed Update of MA Right to Repair Law Headed to Ballot (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/needed-update-of-ma-right-to-repair-law-
headed-to-ballot-300969819.html. The ballot initiative was hotly contested in the lead up to 
the November 3, 2020 vote. See Callum Borchers, Mass. Voters Say ‘Yes’ on Question 1, Expand-
ing Access to Car Repair Data, WBUR NEWS (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020
/11/03/ballot-question-1-right-to-repair-passes [https://perma.cc/85NP-NCP7] (citing the 
amount of money raised for and against Question 1, as well as the misleading advertising 
opponents ran in attempt to convince voters to vote “no”).
200. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Habben, Safety Compliance Eng’r, Wahl Clipper Corp., to 
David Harris, Rep., Ill. Gen. Assembly (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/4446374-Wahl-Opposition-Illinois.html [https://perma.cc/8TCZ-SYHK].
201. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); 
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
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cern, the original Massachusetts act and, correspondingly, the 
MOU state that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to 
require a manufacturer to divulge a trade secret.”202 No provision 
in the new amendments qualifies this exception. Hence, broad 
claims could be made that most or all information related to or 
embedded in the telematics system is a trade secret, in which case 
the manufacturers are under no legal obligation to provide access 
to such information.203 This exception could thus diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the new amendments.
This Article’s response to this argument is two-fold. First, to be 
classified as a “trade secret,” the information must meet the appli-
cable statutory requirements, including that the owner has taken 
reasonable measures to keep the information secret.204 We have 
previously posited that a plausible argument could be made that 
when information is readily shared with authorized dealers (and 
their repair personnel) all over the country, the owner has not tak-
en such reasonable measures.205 Among other things, even where 
manufacturers have entered into confidentiality agreements with 
their authorized dealers, it is unclear whether the repair personnel 
of these authorized dealers have, in turn, entered into similar 
agreements with their employers. Unfortunately, this examination 
of how a trade secret is kept a secret would likely only be undertak-
en in a legal proceeding.206 As we have noted previously, independ-
ent repair shops may not have the means to initiate litigation to 
challenge how manufacturers are keeping their trade secrets con-
fidential.207
And, current case law is not necessarily on the side of repair. In 
fact, federal case law from the Eighth Circuit holds that 
“[r]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy need not be overly ex-
travagant, and absolute secrecy is not required.”208 In this particular 
case, Rolls Royce had entered into confidentiality agreements with 
202. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93K, § 3 (2019). “Trade Secret” is defined in a broad manner 
in section 1.
203. For the likelihood of such an argument brought by car manufacturers, see Matt 
Murphy, Bill Filed to Prevent Skirting Right-to-Repair Law, METRO W. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 
2018), https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20180918/bill-filed-to-prevent-skirting-
right-to-repair-law [https://perma.cc/GN9W-LBQ8] (noting that in the negotiations for the 
original Massachusetts law, the “trade secret” status of telematics systems was actually the 
reason behind automakers insisting on exempting telematics from the scope of the law).
204. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985).
205. Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 123.
206. Id. (“Unfortunately, repair shops that do not have information supplied to them 
due to the manufacturers’ assertion of a trade secret exemption may not have the means to 
initiate litigation challenging this assertion.”).
207. Id.
208. AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 
2011).
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its authorized repair centers and shared repair documents that 
contained a legend indicating confidential information.209 The 
court held that these were reasonable efforts to maintain what 
Rolls Royce claimed to be trade secrets, notwithstanding that the 
alleged trade secrets were accessed through other channels.210 Sim-
ilarly, in the Ford v. Autel litigation discussed above, the district 
court refused to dismiss Ford’s trade secret claim on the pleadings, 
ruling that by disclosing that it only shares its trade secrets with au-
thorized dealers, Ford sufficiently alleged it took reasonable efforts 
to maintain their secrecy.211
Given that “reasonable efforts” are subject to judicial interpreta-
tion, we would urge judges to look beyond superficial attempts at 
confidentiality to the reality of the efforts. This means judges 
should not only look at the confidentiality agreements that the 
manufacturers have in place with their authorized networks, but 
also look at how, if at all, manufacturers monitor and enforce these 
agreements to ensure their trade secrets remain a secret. This is 
similar to what judges do where allegations of “naked licensing”
are made in trademark litigation.212 Where a trademark is licensed, 
the owner has an obligation to monitor the ongoing quality of the 
products which are being sold under their trademark.213 While 
judges look for quality control clauses in licensing agreements, 
they also look at evidence surrounding what steps the licensors 
took to monitor and enforce the agreements.214
The second prong of this Article’s response to the potential that 
manufacturers would assert an overly broad trade secrecy claim is 
to preempt the problem by either deleting the current provision in 
the vehicle repair act that exempts trade secrets altogether215 or re-
placing it with a more nuanced provision that includes an appro-
priate carve-out for diagnostic information. The Repair Association 
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US Inc., No. 14-13760, 2015 WL 5729067, at *7–9 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
212. See, e.g., Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837, 846 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Under 
trademark law, where a licensor does not exercise reasonable quality control over a licensee, 
the mark is deemed abandoned due to the ‘naked licensing.’ ”).
213. See, e.g., Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
naked licensing occurs when a trademark owner fails to maintain quality control over a li-
censee’s use of the mark such that “the mark can no longer provide ‘a meaningful assurance 
of quality.’ ”).
214. See, e.g., Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 738 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he licensor may establish adequate quality control by demonstrating a close 
working relationship between the licensor and the licensee.”).
215. Cf. An Act to Amend Section 1793.03 of the Civil Code, Relating to Consumer War-
ranties, Assemb. B. 1163, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (proposing not to include a 
trade secrets exception in a California right to repair bill in regard to consumer electron-
ics).
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recently proposed model legislation that included a similar provi-
sion in the context of consumer electronics.216 Section 5(a) to the 
model legislation provides: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to require an original equipment manufacturer to divulge a trade 
secret to an owner or an independent service provider except as 
necessary to provide documentation, parts, and tools on fair and 
reasonable terms.”217 The Massachusetts repair act could similarly 
treat information related to diagnostics, maintenance, or repair as 
information that cannot be protected as trade secrets and, there-
fore, is subject to the provisions of the act mandating access. Argu-
ably, if Massachusetts or any other state were to adopt this lan-
guage, the law could be perceived as modifying trade secret law. 
Yet, given that trade secret law is both state and federal, states 
should not shy away from regulating what should (or should not), 
in fact, be a trade secret.218
B. Ownership of Data Claims
Another challenge to the right to repair could be that mandat-
ing manufacturers to provide access to telematic data conflicts with 
their ownership of such data.
This argument does not have a solid legal basis. While data are 
subject to a complex set of regulations, including privacy and secu-
rity regulations, they are largely free from property rights.219 Under 
U.S. copyright law, for instance, while the original “selection, co-
ordination, and arrangement” of data could be the subject of copy-
right protection, the underlying data are never protected by copy-
right and may be freely copied.220 Similarly, whereas personal 
216. For discussion, see Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 120–22.
217. Model State Right-to-Repair Law, REPAIR ASS’N § 5(a) (July 24, 2018), https:
//repair.org/s/Right-to-repair-Model-state-law-7-24-18.docx [https://perma.cc/MTK5-
LYKD].
218. Until recently, trade secret protection relied solely on state law. Sharon K. Sandeen 
& Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 829, 833 (2017) (“The May 11, 2016 enactment of the DTSA created a federal 
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation for the first time. For over 175 years, 
state law governed civil trade secret principles in the U.S . . . .”). In 2016, Congress enacted 
the Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 34 U.S.C.), but the legislation does not 
preempt or displace state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (Supp. 2018). This means that state-based 
definitions of a trade secret (either through legislation or through judicial interpretation) 
can continue to coexist with a federal definition. Sandeen & Seaman, supra, at 905 (noting 
that on its face, the federal definition appears to be narrower in how it defines “infor-
mation”).
219. See, e.g., Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2018).
220. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
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property laws could protect physical manifestations of information 
(like traffic signs), they do not protect the information itself.221
Most importantly, even if data were subject to property rights, in 
the case of diagnostics data created by a vehicle, it would make 
much more sense to allocate such rights to the vehicle owner ra-
ther than to the manufacturer of the vehicle. The vehicle creates 
the data in the course of its use by the owner. There would be no 
data if the owner did not use the vehicle. The fact that this data is 
transmitted to the manufacturer in real time, just because the lat-
ter designed the car to do so, should not create an ownership at-
tachment between the manufacturer and such data.
Finally, even if it were true that manufacturers owned diagnos-
tics data transmitted via telematics systems, it would not mean that 
legislation could not mandate them to provide others with access 
to such data. Property rights are often subject to various legal ex-
ceptions and limitations predicated on the need to enable access 
to other parties. Consider, for instance, copyright’s fair use doc-
trine or the concept of real property easements.222 As demonstrated 
by this Article’s analysis, there is clearly a need to ensure vehicle 
owners and independent mechanics can access diagnostic infor-
mation.223
C. Safety Concerns with Open and Connected Software
As part of their objection to the call for greater access to 
telematics, manufacturers could also raise safety and security con-
cerns. Safety concerns are not unique to the telematics scenario. 
Arguments based on safety and quality of repair have been raised 
before in the context of the right to repair cars,224 as well as other 
consumer products.225 There is nothing exclusive to the telematics 
scenario that increases the safety risks associated with car repairs.
Generally speaking, in a competitive repair market, consumers 
could switch to alternative repair services, including ones offered 
by the original manufacturer or its authorized agents, in case their 
221. See Determann, supra note 219, at 13. While this is not the focus of this paper, we 
should note, in brief, that we generally find this current legal regime justified from a policy 
perspective.
222. For copyright’s fair use doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107. For a definition of an ease-
ment, see Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States. 572 U.S. 93 (2014) (“An easement is 
a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the 
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”).
223. See infra Section I.C & Part III.
224. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 91 (presenting the argument that enabling access to 
car code could result in making cars dangerous to drive).
225. See Grinvald & Tur-Sinai, supra note 20, at 122–23.
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independent repair shop does not provide a high-quality service. 
Absent any concrete market failures, the invisible hand of the mar-
ket can presumably be trusted in this context. Most importantly, 
the more the original manufacturers support repair businesses ra-
ther than fighting them, the better the quality of repairs is likely to 
be. Providing reasonable access to available diagnostic and repair 
information (as well as diagnostic tools, training, etc.) is a crucial 
component in mitigating any safety concerns associated with third 
party repairs.
The only unique challenge associated with telematics-based di-
agnostics seems to be the need to ensure data is transmitted wire-
lessly in a safe way.226 Yet, this challenge arises out of the actual 
switch from OBD ports to telematics-based diagnostics, a step taken 
by the manufacturers themselves. There is clearly a need to con-
tinually enhance security measures employed in connection with 
transmission of data from and to cars.227 Yet this does not contra-
dict enabling secured access to some portions of the car’s data for 
certain sets of approved users—in this case, access to diagnostic da-
ta for third party repairers authorized by the vehicle owner.
D.  Looking into the Future: Remote Repairs
One of the more interesting challenges to a right to repair cars 
will come from the future of repairs: wireless and remote repairs. 
Instead of sending notices to their users to bring their cars into an 
authorized dealer for a software repair,228 manufacturers will simply 
“push” the repair to the cars without the need for users to do any-
thing.229 Tesla has been the pioneer on this front with “over-the-air”
software repairs.230 In fact, with autonomous vehicles just on the 
horizon, remote repairs will likely become a necessity. “After all, if 
you don’t want to be bothered driving the car, you’re not likely to 
want to waste time taking it in to the dealership for a fix, either.”231
226. See, e.g., MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 75, at 17–20 (discussing the various privacy 
concerns).
227. See generally Kessler, supra note 2.
228. See John R. Quain, With Benefits – and Risks – Software Updates Are Coming to the Car,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/over-the-air-software-
updates-cars-pros-cons [https://perma.cc/DD3W-LBB9] (“According to NHTSA, today only 
62 percent of recalled cars ever get repaired–even after owners have been sent multiple no-
tices. OTA could eliminate many of these compliance problems, and save millions of dollars 
in maintenance work in the process.”).
229. See Alex Brisbourne, Tesla’s Over-the-Air Fix: Best Example Yet of the Internet of Things?,
WIRED (Feb. 2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/02/teslas-air-fix-best-ex
ample-yet-internet-things [https://perma.cc/L6V9-FVNP].
230. See generally id.
231. See Quain, supra note 228.
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The question will be whether manufacturers are successful in 
maintaining a monopoly over these remote repairs in all situations. 
The challenge that will likely be raised to allowing independent 
repair shops access to push remote repairs will be similar to other 
arguments discussed in this Part. Yet the competitive need to allow 
an open market for car repairs—either in a physical shop or re-
motely—does not change as technology updates. In addition, if the 
experience with Tesla is any indication, there will hopefully be 
consumer backlash over attempts to monopolize all repairs.232
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this Article demonstrates how the law can, and 
should, be adapted to keep pace with technological developments. 
Currently, there is a risk that newly enhanced technological abili-
ties could enable manufacturers to evade their legal duties and 
suppress competition in the market for repair services. In just a few 
years since the passage of the 2012 Massachusetts law and the 2014 
MOU, car manufacturers have utilized legal ambiguity around 
telematics to skirt their obligations in a manner that severely 
threatens competition in the market for car repairs. There are 
good reasons to believe that this situation is only going to get worse 
in the near future. To maintain the spirit of the law and secure 
consumer choice with respect to car repair, adaptations must take 
place.
Altogether, we believe a multi-pronged and multi-agency ap-
proach is needed to provide for an effective right to repair cars, as 
well as other consumer products. We support the new Massachu-
setts law that requires car manufacturers to provide third parties 
with reasonable access to diagnostic and repair information trans-
mitted via telematics systems. Hopefully, now that the new law has 
passed in Massachusetts, the MOU will also be updated to include 
similar provisions.
Moreover, due to the potential for deceptive advertising and the 
ability of manufacturers to take advantage of their relationships 
with consumers, this area should be closely examined and possibly 
regulated. Manufacturers’ control over telematics systems for pur-
poses of advertising their services and products threatens consum-
er choice and competition in repair markets. We hope the FTC’s
232. See Mike Moffitt, The Thing About Owning a Tesla No One Talks About—Nightmarish 
Repair Delays, SF GATE (May 28, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/cars/article/tesla-
repair-wait-time-complaints-electric-car-13796037.php [https://perma.cc/ZQ5P-RKFV].
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ongoing investigation into the repair industry will produce con-
crete actions in this respect.
Finally, we should not be concerned simply with consumer pro-
tection laws and policies but also federal intellectual property laws. 
As the discussion in this Article shows, without due attention paid 
to intellectual property laws, an effective right to repair cannot be 
implemented.

